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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the roles news media and think tanks play in U.S. foreign policy in an 
analysis of their possible effects on each other’s agendas. In an analysis of salience of, or attention to, 
multiple countries over time in coverage from leading U.S. newspapers, The New York Times and 
Washington Post, and in published online materials from leading U.S. foreign policy think tanks, 
Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the research looks at the 
presence, direction, and strength of agenda-setting effects in the construction of news agendas and 
attention foci of think tanks. Findings suggest that the relationship between news agenda and agendas of 
the think tanks is situational, strong when present, highly reciprocal in some cases and unidirectional 
(either from think tanks to news media content or the other way around) in others. The connection 
between the agendas of think tanks and the news agenda, as well as the possible impact of think tanks on 
news media attention to countries, suggest that think tanks should be included in foreign policy agenda-
setting models, traditionally limited to policymakers (president and congress), public, and media as active 
participants. The ability of news media to affect the attention foci of think tanks necessitates consideration 
of their content in investigating the impact of think tanks. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
Thousands of think tanks have emerged over the past few decades on national and 
international political stages, in both developed and developing democracies. By some estimates, 
there are more than 6,600 think tanks worldwide, and nearly 2,000 are in the U.S. (McGann, 
2015, p. 53). As the numbers of think tanks have been increasing, arguably so have their 
significance and influence (Abelson, 1996; Dickson, 1971; McGann, 2005; Sanders, 2009; 
Weidenbaum, 2009). Still relatively new players in the political arena1, think tanks manage to 
drive economic and political change worldwide, according to the think tanks themselves and 
researchers who are not necessarily associated with them. Their role of  “catalysts of political 
and economic reform” (McGann, 2010b, p. 3) appears especially significant in developing and 
transitional regimes -  those moving from authoritarianism to democracy. 
In these countries, alongside on-site organizations, U.S.-based think tanks catalyze 
reforms and drive democratic changes, as they “reinforce and encourage the western-preferred 
image of democracy” (Scott, 1999, p. 148). They do so through engaging directly with foreign 
governments and NGOs2 and through “strengthening the advocacy tools of local and 
                                                 
 
1 Though some authors, including one of more prominent think tanks scholars, Donald Abelson (1966), 
push the birth date of think tanks beyond the 19th century, RAND Corporation, formed during World War II, is often 
regarded as the first think tank in the modern understanding of the term (Smith, 1971). Later parts of the past 
century have seen the emergence of the majority of think tanks: More than 90% of U.S. and European think tanks 
were created since 1951; over a third of all think tanks in these two regions were created in a relatively recent period 
between 1981 and 1990; since 1980, the number of think tanks in the United States more than doubled (McGann, 
2015, p. 10). 
2 For example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of the top foreign policy think tanks in 
the United States, established ‘Moscow Center for Russian and Eurasian Programmes,’ which draws “participants 
from across the Russian and foreign political spectrum and from Moscow’s media and diplomatic communities” 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.-b). Carnegie Endowment also maintains offices in in Beijing, 
Beirut, and Brussels. 
2 
 
transnational activists” by means of accumulating and disseminating knowledge  (Scott, 1999, p. 
155). Think tanks bridge the gap between governments, NGOs, and experts by organizing and 
facilitating conferences, seminars, and other networking opportunities3. Some of their impacts on 
global democratization and political transformations in the world are not as straightforward, and 
their influence is not always direct. 
One such mediated influence channel for think tanks is their impact on the U.S. foreign 
policy. While empirical research illustrates “moderate but consistent worldwide effect of U.S. 
democracy promotion” (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson, 2007, p. 436), the only remaining 
super power (Wiarda, 2009) and an active promoter of democracy (Meernik, 1996), the United 
States of America is headquarters to more think tanks than any place in the world. The U.S. is 
the cradle of think tank development (Abelson, 1996, 2009; Dickson, 1971; Rich, 2004; J. A. 
Smith, 1991; P. I. S. Smith, 1971) and their current haven. Organizations based in the U.S. 
dominate ratings4, which, among other criteria, account for the impact a think tank’s research has 
had on policy5. 
American think tanks, compared with their international counterparts, appear to have 
more significance in the world of politics and “play a major part in the formulation and 
                                                 
 
3 As an illustration, Brookings Institution, another leading American foreign policy think tank, in 
cooperation with Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), started The Global Institute, an initiative set 
to “highest standard for research and policy analysis” in developing countries (Brookings Institution, n.d.-c). 
Member-organizations of the institute held a series of conferences in Moscow and Beijing, which brought together 
academics, representatives of governments. and international organizations, and “fostered more and deeper dialogue 
among thinkers and leaders.” (Brookings Institution) 
4 As an example, in the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go to Think Tanks Index Report, among the 
top 10 think tanks worldwide (McGann, 2015, p. 65) and the in top-ten foreign policy and international affairs think 
tanks (McGann, 2015, p. 98), six organizations, the majority in both cases, were based in the United States. Seven 
out of top 10 international development think tanks are (McGann, 2015, p. 102) are U.S.-based as well. 
5 The rating system developed for the above Report, in order to assess this impact, looks at “Policy 
recommendations considered or actually adopted by policymakers, civil society or policy actors” (McGann, 2015, p. 
50). 
3 
 
implementation of the U.S. foreign policy. Research shows (Jacobs & Page, 2005) that, among 
other outside influences6, only internationally oriented business leaders have a more pronounced 
footprint on the U.S. foreign policy than do policy experts. Wiarda (2008) argues that, among 
trained experts and groups of experts, think tanks (by steering clear from general abstract 
models, being aware of bureaucratic aspect of policymaking, and by keeping tabs on current 
concerns among policymakers) have significantly more influence on American politics than do 
their academic counterparts. Despite the fact that “little progress has been made in evaluating the 
nature and extent of their [think tanks] contribution to public policy” (Abelson, 2006, p. 163), 
and that “…it is impossible to assign a numerical value to the amount of influence think tanks 
wield” (Abelson, 2009, p. 170), academic literature admits that “…an elite group of think tanks 
continue to make their presence felt…” (Abelson, 2009, p. 176). As a policymaker puts it, “of 
the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the 
most important and least appreciated” (Haass, 2002, p. 5). According to Richard Haass (2002), a 
former Director of Policy and Planning U.S. Department of State, thinks tanks offer a number of 
vital benefits, including generating news ideas for government, supplying trained experts for 
Congress and administration, providing a new venue for policymakers to “build shared 
understanding on policy options” (Haass, 2002, p. 7), mediating party conflicts, and educating 
and engaging public. 
                                                 
 
6 The research included a survey of foreign policy issue positions among policymakers, foreign policy 
experts, business leaders, labor leaders, and general public. Besides think tanks, or “special foreign policy 
organizations,” the experts group also included educators and “private foreign policy groups” (Jacobs & Page, 2005, 
p. 110). News media and other mass media representatives were excluded from the analysis, as well as minority, 
religious, and special interest groups’ leaders as not relevant within the theoretical approach of the mentioned 
research. 
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Dubbed the “powerhouses” of U.S. politics, think tanks assumed a “major role” in the 
“kaleidoscope of influences that is our [U.S.] foreign policy” (Wiarda, 2008, p. 117). However, 
what that major role is exactly and how independent the influence of think tanks is from other 
pieces in the foreign policy kaleidoscope, remains unknown7 A kaleidoscope’s mirrors and 
colored glass create an illusion of a whole image. Knowing which colors of influence in foreign 
policy think tanks create and which ones they merely reflect is of great significance in a study of 
their impact. Before we can see the foreign policy kaleidoscope as a whole, we must examine the 
interactions among its individual components has to be carried out. 
Think tanks interact with and adapt to other foreign policy kaleidoscope pieces. As an 
example of their adaptive strategies, think tanks often adjust their agenda to those of 
policymakers and “keep current on the everyday political and bureaucratic changes” in order to 
better “plug into the system in ways that academic scholars generally do not” (Wiarda, 2008, p. 
99). The impact think tanks have on foreign policy, or at least the area of such impact, could be 
pre-determined, or at least significantly affected, by outside factors including the agenda of 
policymakers and other elements of the foreign policy system into which think tanks plug 
themselves. And policymakers are not the only integral part in it. 
News media also could be affecting or possibly sometimes even determining what colors 
think tanks contribute to the foreign policy kaleidoscope. Think tanks interact extensively with 
news media in the foreign policy arena. However, despite the reliance of think tanks on news 
media and their tactic of deliberately adjusting their agenda to that of others, the relationship 
                                                 
 
7 A review of literature in next chapter provides a brief overview on the state of research on think tanks. It 
illustrates a consensus in academic world on the presence of think tanks influence in politics, and no agreement as 
per extent or exact nature of think tans impact. 
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between think tanks and news media is often described in academic literature as unidirectional 
(Abelson, 1996, 2009; Krastev, 2001; O'Neill, 2008; Rich, 2001, 2004; Weidenbaum, 2009, 
2010). Prominent think tank researchers mention news media as “channels” (Abelson, 2006) 
used by think tanks to reach their goals, mere bullhorns for their messages. 
While this channel of influence is of high and increasing importance for think tanks, they 
rely heavily on news media to disseminate and promote research (Abelson, 1996), establish 
visibility (Rich, 2004) for themselves and their sponsors, to militate for both their research 
findings but also their advocacy positions8 and to ultimately “shape public opinion and public 
policy”(Abelson, 2009, p. 85). Regardless of the actual (and generally immeasurable) outcomes 
of the interactions between news media and think tanks, the latter are able to generate “a useful 
measurement of how much influence think tanks wield” (Abelson, 2012b, p. 1) - media exposure 
statistics. In the absence of other tangible proofs of their effectiveness, this statistic is widely 
used by think tanks to “foster the illusion of having influence” (Abelson, 2012b, p. 1). 
 Consequently, similarly to how they adjust to policymakers and bureaucracy (Wiarda, 
2008), thinks tanks may have to make adjustments in order to garner media attention. They have 
to play by the media’s rules to gain visibility and impact. After all, “… only the media can 
determine how much exposure these organizations will be granted” (Abelson, 1996, p. 90). In 
order to garner such valuable news media exposure, think tanks go to great lengths to 
accommodate the news media and streamline the work with them. Among other tactics, think 
tanks design programs to “flood the mainstream print media with hundreds of op-ed articles each 
                                                 
 
8 As Donald Abelson (1996, p. 89) put it, “… education the public is not the sole objective of think-tanks,” 
and as Wiarda (2008, p. 97) explains it “What members of think tanks do is think (and write and publish and 
disseminate their products) about public policy issues; they also serve as advocates for their public positions.” 
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year” (Abelson, 2009, p. 87) and develop personal relationships with journalists. Some think 
tanks devote major resources to this end9. Because news media are important to think tanks, their 
agenda may affect the amount of attention think tanks pay to a particular topic, similar to how 
agendas of policymakers affect this attention. After all, news media manage to affect other pieces 
of the foreign policy kaleidoscope. 
Literature on thinks tanks often fails to note that news media have a significant influence 
over political processes in the United States in general (Bimber, 2011; Entman, 2000; Rosefielde, 
2007; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2000) and on U.S. foreign policy in particular (Miller, 2007; Nacos, 
Shapiro, & Isernia, 2000; O'Heffernan, 1991; Serfaty, 1990; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2000; Wiarda, 
2009). 
News media affect foreign policy in multiple ways10. They shape what concerns the 
public. By virtue of often being an exclusive source of information on foreign policy topics, they 
tell the public what to pay attention to11 (Cohen, 1963), which issue to consider more important 
and which ones – less so (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In doing so, the news media affect greatly 
salience of foreign policy issues, and through it, directly (in direct reaction from the government 
                                                 
 
9 Brookings Institution, for example, spent almost $2.3 million on communications in the 2013 fiscal year 
(Brookings Institution, 2014, p. 41), but Heritage Foundation valued the news media exposure enough to allocate 
nearly $11.4 million (or 6.8 percent of organization’s operating expenses in 2013) to media and government 
relations (Heritage Foundation, 2014, p. 47). 
10 Most of which revolve around news media function of “collecting, framing, and distributing 
information—the key [foreign policy] market commodity” (Baum & Potter, 2008). In doing so, they enable new 
actors to gain access to this market, like the public, who otherwise may have been able to participate in the 
exchange.  
11 Stuart Soroka (2003, p. 43) argues (as a result of another empirical inquiry of agenda-setting effects) 
that, at the end of the day, “… if we learn about these [foreign policy] events, it is almost surely the product of 
media coverage.” 
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to changes in issue salience12) and indirectly (issue salience effects how politicians are judged13) 
affect foreign policy (Soroka, 2003).  
The news media impact on foreign policy does not always have to be mediated by the 
public. Salience of issues in the news coverage has been shown to affect directly presidential 
(Edwards & Wood, 1999; Wood & Peake, 1998) and congressional (Soroka, 2003; Tan & 
Weaver, 2007) attention and actions, as well as the attention actions of  policymakers generally 
(Cook et al., 1983). 
Directly or through effects on the public, news media influence in foreign policy is often 
carried out though the agenda-setting mechanisms. In foreign policy research, agenda-setting is 
normally described as an interaction among three inter-influenced entities, the news media, the 
public, and policymakers (Edwards & Wood, 1999; Peake, 2001; Peake & Eshbaugh-Soha, 
2008; Rutledge & Larsen Price, 2014; Soroka, 2003; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004; Wood & 
Peake, 1998). 
The very first systematic foreign policy agenda-setting study (Wood & Peake, 1998) 
looked at the president and the news media and interdependence of their attention to foreign 
policy issues. Congress quickly got injected into the mix of participants in foreign policy agenda-
setting (Edwards & Wood, 1999) and soon after, the role of public opinion in the process gained 
some attention (Soroka, 2003) as well, followed by a good deal of evaluations for strength and 
directions of influences under various circumstances (Baum & Potter, 2008; Peake, 2001; Peake 
                                                 
 
12 In Soroka’s (2003, p. 41) research, “… public preferences have a positive and significant effect on 
defense spending [a foreign policy issue]” in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
13 Driven by the assumption of issue priming effect, that “by calling attention to some matters while 
ignoring others, television [or print] news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and 
candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) 
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& Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008; Rutledge & Larsen Price, 2014; Tan & Weaver, 2007). No place has 
been allocated in the reviewed literature to think tanks in the news media, public and 
policymakers triangle. 
An additional element, agenda-setting, buttresses the study’s hypotheses. As the theory’s 
connection to the context of the study, in its rather recent application to foreign policy formation, 
agenda-setting describes the mechanism of issue salience transmission between groups. This 
application of the theory does not include a possibly signifficant group, e.g. think tanks, and may 
need revision. 
 
Rationale 
This dissertation serves two main goals: 
1. Advancing our understanding of the role think tanks play in foreign policy. 
2. Bettering our knowledge of mechanisms for news media effects in foreign policy and 
to advance our understanding of the news media effects at large. 
While academic literature speaks of think tanks as influential in foreign policy entities 
and alludes to their growing impact, the exact nature and magnitude of this impact are thought to 
be largely immeasurable at this point (Abelson, 2009). Think tanks, considering their potential 
weight in foreign policy formation and their close relationships with at least two of the 
traditional foreign policy agenda-setters (news media and policymakers), may have an integral 
role to play in the process of foreign policy agenda-setting. Foreign policy agenda-setting 
research tradition may provide a valuable conceptual and methodological framework for 
detecting and measuring the strength of the content produced by think tanks. If evidence of their 
influence on classic agenda-setters is found, the traditional foreign policy agenda-setting 
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triangulation will have to change shape and include think tanks. This research could find signs of 
a dependence between think tanks foci and news agenda and thus provide such evidence.  
As already alluded to, the news media influence the public and policymakers. We posit 
here that the media could also influence other major participants in the political process, such as 
think tanks. Walter Lippmann’s “out of sight, out of mind” formula may be very much 
applicable to the process of the formation of think tanks foci. In Public Opinion, a work 
fundamental for agenda-setting research, Lippmann (1922) suggested that the world of politics 
(in particular of international relations including foreign policy decision-making, as in our case) 
is remote from our everyday lives. It is not unfolding right before our eyes. The public in 
particular, but also research fellows and policy consultants, have to rely on news and other 
sources for information about these foreign policy processes. The news media could also be 
telling the think tanks “what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). While no major research of 
agenda-setting effects on organizations, such as foreign policy-oriented think tanks, was found in 
the review of academic literature, this study aims to advance our understanding of the media’s 
agenda-setting mechanisms. 
Should think tanks show themselves to be another affected by news media, along with the 
public and policymakers, this would demonstrate the news media’s ability to affect research 
organizations and to set foci for policy research and advocacy. As related to foreign policy, think 
tanks, if their foci are affected by salience of issues in news coverage, could be mediating and/or 
amplifying news media agenda-setting effects on U.S. foreign policy. If detected, studies of 
media effects on think tanks, through think tanks, and aided (or compromised) by think tanks 
effects on policymakers and the public, may help us build a more comprehensive foreign policy 
10 
 
agenda-setting models and learn more about circumstances under which agenda-setting effects 
are possible. 
This investigation of the potential link between think tanks and the news media could 
also contribute to the resolution of the addressed in the next chapter. While a great variety of 
definitions circulate academic literature (Ladi, 2005), divorce of think tanks from outside 
influences is often used as a factor in their definition as independent organizations or at least a 
basis to distinguish between various types of think tanks. For example, in a revised version of 
one of the most popular (Pautz, 2011) definitions by Kent Weaver, think tanks are “non-
governmental, not-for-profit research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy 
from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties” 
(McGann & Weaver, 2000, p. 4). Another popular definition considers think tanks to be 
“independent, non-interest-based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on 
expertise and ideas to obtain support and influence the policy-making process.” The level of 
independence of think tanks, organizations that adjust their agenda to fit that of policymakers, or 
(if the proof is found) that of news media as well, could be questioned and definitions might need 
to be revised. 
Interdependence of media agenda and agendas of think tanks is a crucial aspect of the 
interaction between the two institutions, for it reflects of the influences they could be exerting on 
each other. In order to understand think tanks and news media individual and combined impacts 
on foreign policy, it is important to study this aspect of their relationship in more detail. The 
fundamental questions addressed, are (1) whether choices of research and advocacy topics think 
tanks make could be affected by the dynamics in news media attention, and (2) could the foci of 
think tank attention be affecting what the news media cover? To answer these questions, the 
11 
 
dissertation compares dynamics of attention to different countries in work published and 
mentioned on the websites14 of Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, the two most influential think tanks in U.S. foreign policy15, and content16 of major 
newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post, over a period of time.  
These questions are developed further in light of the agenda-setting theoretical approach, 
and presented, alongside with research hypotheses, in chapter three. 
This study will advance our understanding of the role policy think tanks play in foreign 
policy and the ways they can possibly affect it. Such an understanding could help both 
policymakers and think tanks establish and maintain productive relationships. Additionally, 
knowing what role, if any, news coverage plays in determining the attention of think tanks would 
enable us to discover a new channel of their influence on world politics, and though it, on lives 
of people. 
  
                                                 
 
14 Research articles, commentary, lectures, symposia, interviews, policy recommendations, testimonies and 
other recorded and other activities published by think tanks on their websites.  
15 According to their ratings in 2013 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report (McGann, 2014). See Chapter 
4 for more detailed explanation. 
16 News stories, editorials, blogs. 
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Chapter 2. 
Background 
 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in academic literature about the term think tank and the 
phenomenon it represents. The first section of this chapter, in separate subsections, looks at some 
of the reasons behind the difficulties in defining and classifying think tanks, including 
independent evolutions of the term and the phenomenon, peculiarities of think tank evolution, 
and the fact that organizations that originated in various periods still coexist together. Lastly, the 
section briefly discusses the diversity of approaches to think tank classifications and defines the 
term as it is used here. 
The chapter then describes the state of research on think tanks and gives an overview of 
academic literature on their interactions with news media. It then makes a case for the active role 
of news media in foreign policy, while paying special attention to the mechanisms of foreign 
policy agenda-setting, in which news media are considered a fundamental element. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the evolution of foreign policy agenda-setting research and 
demonstrates where think tanks may fit the model. 
 
History of the term think tank 
According to Paul Smith (1971) “the think tank is really the brainchild of Dr Vannevar 
Bush,” an MIT professor who was able to work successfully with the U.S. Air Force during the 
Second World War. The “brainchild” materialized in 1945 in the formation of one of the oldest 
think tanks, Project RAND, restructured three years later into the Rand Corporation (RAND, 
n.d.). Historical records and anecdotal evidence suggest, however, that think tanks, both the term 
and the phenomenon, trace their origins much further back.  
13 
 
Smith discovered that early uses of the term “think tank” could be found in the 1908 
edition of Partridge’s Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English. The metaphor was used 
then as a synonym for “think box” and referred to the brain of an individual. During WWII, the 
term think tank was often used in military jargon to describe “a secure room where plans and 
strategies could be discussed” (A. Denham & Garnett, 1996, p. 44).  
The term had existed for a long time and had different meanings before it was associated 
with organizations it denotes today. It was not until the 1960s that the term was widely used by 
U.S. mass media to refer to non-profit research and advisory corporations, which in their turn, 
had been in existence for some time before acquiring their name. RAND became an independent 
organization in 1948; Brookings Institution formed in 1916 (Brookings Institution, n.d.-b); and 
the Carnegie Endowment was founded in 1910 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
n.d.-a). 
The evolution of think tanks seems to have begun well before they acquired their name. 
According to Donald Abelson (2009, p. 17), “very few” policy institutes existed until WWII, but 
he admitted that some think tank-like organizations did exist prior to the period. In his 1991 
book, The idea broker : think tanks and the rise of the new policy elite, James Smith (1991, p. 1) 
quotes President Woodrow Wilson: “What I fear therefore, is a government of experts. God 
forbid that in a democratic country we should resign the tasks and give the government over to 
experts.” Smith used this quote to illustrate the role that university-trained policy experts had 
already began to play in the U.S. policy making by the beginning of the twentieth century, well 
before Project Rand was conceived. 
Among other organizations, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Bureau of Municipal 
Research, both established in 1907, are sometimes mentioned as the first U.S. national think 
14 
 
tanks (Rich, 2004). These were not just ephemeral “experts,” singular and unorganized, but 
structured task forces, designed to solve particular problems for the U.S. government – very 
much like Project Rand and some of the more recently established17 consequential organizations. 
Paul Dickson argued that the think tank phenomenon predated the term “think tank,” 
whatever meaning the term had. “It started in 1832, when Secretary of the Treasury, confronted 
by pesky steam boilers that kept exploding in American steamboats, contracted with the Franklin 
Institute of Philadelphia to  study the problem” (Dickson, 1971, p. 9). 
Abelson (1996) went even further in saying that “… the physical absence of autonomous, 
non-profit, research institutions prior to 1832 cannot by itself be used as a barometer to measure 
the interaction between intellectuals and government.” He argued that major educational 
institutions (e.g. Harvard University, Yale University, Princeton University, Columbia 
University and Brown University), which existed even before the Franklin Institute was 
established, were bound to interact with government officials and to share their research results. 
Even though he failed to provide any proof of such interactions, Abelson raised a valid point in 
pushing the period of think tanks origins farther back in order to better understand their 
evolution, and thus their functions, influences, and the nature of their interactions with other 
political players. 
The Second World War, “when the government drew heavily on the scientific 
community to wage war,” (Dickson, 1971, p. 11) and the period of extensive political changes of 
                                                 
 
17 According to Donald Abelson (2009), three waves of think tanks formation followed WWII and creation 
of RAND, during which some of today’s top foreign policy think tanks (McGann, 2015) were founded, including 
Foreign Policy Research institute (founded in 1955, 49th top foreign policy think tank in the world), Hudson Institute 
(1961, 41st), Heritage Foundation (1973, 24th), Cato Institute (1977, 17th), Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (1962, 5th). 
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the late 1970s and 1980s gave birth to many think tanks. James Smith (1991) estimated more 
than 1,200 private and university-based think tanks were functioning in the United States by the 
1990s. According to 2015 data from the Think Tanks and Civil Society Program at the 
International Relations Program, University of Pennsylvania, there were more than 1,800 think 
tanks in the USA (McGann, 2015). 
What could we consider a “think tank” then? Which of the proposed ‘ancestors’ could be 
used as the prototype? The answer is: very likely, none of them. However, the fact that so many 
‘species’ are treated as the ‘primeval think tank’, along with the short history of the term (after 
its re-adoption as a descriptor for certain organizations and groups), could explain the ambiguity 
in modern definitions. While the term “think tank” did not appear with the birth of any of the 
‘primeval specimens’ discussed above, narrowing our definition before looking in more detail at 
various ways to group them could leave a key actor, think tanks, out of consideration. 
The academic literature describes two different, yet often overlapping groupings of think 
tanks, periods of development, and structural or (sometimes both) functional distinctions. 
 
Periods of think tank development 
Think tanks in the United States have been developing in different socio-political 
circumstances, which, to certain degree, determined the nature of their organizational structure, 
missions, ideologies, and tactics. Academic literature defines several notable periods of think 
tank development, usually connected to major historic events and accompanying them socio-
political transformations. 
David Ricci (1993) assigns two such periods, the Liberal Age and the Conservative 
Response. The former is associated with the rise of political activism during John F. Kennedy’s 
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presidency and the flourishing of public interest groups (e.g. Center for Responsive Law, 
Congress Watch, etc.) and new federal offices (e.g. Environmental Protection Agency, Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, et al.), aimed at reforming various “quality-of-life matters,” (Ricci, 
1993, p. 149). The latter period is characterized by the emergence of the “New Right” 
institutions (e.g. Heritage Foundation, Christian Voice, et al.), which condemned the “weak on 
strategic thinking” practices of the “Old Right,” which mainly reacted to liberal pressure as 
opposed to initiating its own projects (Ricci, 1993, p. 155). 
According to Andrew Rich, there were four periods, starting at an earlier date. The first 
American think tanks (the Russell Sage Foundation and the Bureau of Municipal Research, both 
incorporated in 1907) were adherents to the ideals of a Progressive Era18 and were confident that 
“expertise from the burgeoning social science could solve public problems and inform 
government decision making” (Rich, 2004, p. 34). By the middle of the twentieth century, think 
tanks had established their presence in American politics, but were changing and adapting to the 
new environment. The aftermath of the Depression and the demands of the Second World War 
drove U.S. government officials to hire think tanks directly19. In anticipation of the end of the 
war, private interests also began hiring think tanks20 in attempts to generate high employment in 
the postwar economy, thus beginning the third period in the development of think tanks, 
                                                 
 
18 The Progressive Era, a period between the 1890s and 1920s, was characterized by innovative policy and 
an unprecedented number of reforms intended to fix multiple issues brought about by the industrialization in the 
United States. Supporters of the Progressivist movement “fought to expand democracy, professionalize government, 
and make industrial capitalism more humane” (Robertson, 2014). 
19 This is the time when President Franklin D. Roosevelt formed the “brain trust,” a group of senior 
officials and advisees that included Columbia University professors (Patrick, Pious, & Ritchie) and when RAND 
began advising Air Force (RAND, n.d.).  
20 As an example, established in 1942, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) worked directly 
with the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers; and the American Enterprise 
Association was formed using money from Louis Brown of the Johns Manville Corporation (Rich, 2004). 
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characterized by a higher level of diversity of politically credible organizations. The ever-
growing government was casting a thick shadow on “desirability and possibility of achieving 
social change though governmental programs” (Rich, 2004, p. 45). During the fourth period, the 
relationship between the growing government, which caused some problems by its own efforts or 
lack of thereof (i.e. civil rights issues during the Vietnam conflict), and think tanks changed 
significantly in the 1960s. Political mobilization of businesses, Christian groups, as well 
increasing popularity of neoclassical economic theory at universities, and the resurgence of the 
Left after its retreat during the McCarthy era, accommodated the flowering of conservative think 
tanks in 1960s and 1970s. Concurrently, even more liberal institutions were gathering strength in 
response to what they saw as the government’s incapacity to bring about desirable (liberal) 
changes. These factors triggered some very significant changes in the world of think tanks and 
American politics. The 1969 Tax Reform Act disallowed support of efforts to “influence the 
outcome” of political campaigns and legislation, which removed some of the key donors (which 
had been the main source of funding for think tanks up until this point21) as sponsors for think 
tanks. Changing patronage shifted the priorities for think tanks in the new era of their 
development, giving prominence to marketing activities and creating the necessity to emphasize 
their own visibility in order to attract financial support. 
In another historical analysis, the evolution of think tanks spans three typological 
generations, according to their main goals and donors (Abelson, 1996). Think tanks of the first 
generation (exemplified, among other organizations, by The Carnegie Endowment for 
                                                 
 
21 The Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, two of the principal funders for think tanks, were 
involved in the investigation, which resulted in the Tax Reform Act. Brookings Institution, for instance, received a 
$14 million grant from the former in 1966 and was supported earlier by the latter. After the reform, these two, and 
other sources of monetary support were lost for think tanks (Rich, 2004). 
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International Peace and the Brookings Institution, and reaching into the mid and late 1940s) were 
philanthropic, meant to provide “a stimulating environment in which to conduct scholarly 
research,” as opposed to “indoctrinating the policy-making community with a particular 
ideological orientation” (Abelson, 1996, p. 47). The second generation of think tanks, the 
“government contractors,” such as the Rand Corporation, were hired by the U.S. government 
following WWII in hopes to “… meet many of the new challenges confronting the United States 
as it assumed the role of a global hegemonic power” (Abelson, 1996, p. 47).  The third 
generation of think tanks was characterized by the transition from policy research to political 
advocacy. Among others, The American Enterprise Institute, The Heritage Foundation, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Trilateral Commission and The Committee 
on the Present Danger employed various lobbying techniques in order to advance their 
ideological agenda, as opposed to having the pursuit of social science research as their primary 
goal. It is important to note that the three periods overlap chronologically and the main 
determining criterion in attributing a think tank to one generation or the other is in its missions 
and goals. So, for example, while established in 1948, Rand Corporation belongs to the second 
generation established in 1943, while the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research exemplifies the third. The former started out as a government contractor and served 
mainly the needs of the Air Force, while the latter was established by a corporation president and 
had the promotion of free-market economy as a goal.  
Abelson’s generations of think tanks, in a sense, are closer to some of the following 
functional and structural classifications than to the periodical groupings presented earlier, since 
chronological order in which think tanks were founded is of lesser importance for categorization 
of think tanks then their structure and activities. Some organizations, including the Brookings 
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Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, even though they belong to 
older generations, still exist today and function in the new environment alongside with newly 
emerged and emerging counterparts. 
 
Classifications of think tanks and working definition 
In her comparison of different think tanks typologies and classifications, Stella Ladi 
(2005, p. 49) Claimed to have realized “why scholars find it so difficult to establish a single 
definition.” She looked at Weaver’s typology (R. K. Weaver, 1989), McGann’s classification 
(McGann, 1995), and Diane Stone’s (1995) take on the grouping of policy research organizations 
and found little consensus among these different understandings of what defines a think tank and 
what organizations one should call think tanks. 
To date, multiple attempts at classifying think tanks have already been made. Some 
deserve special attention as more popular or representative trends in research of think tanks. 
Paul Smith, for example, identified seven categories of non-for-profit institutes in the 
United States, based on their main goals and missions. The first group, the independent contract 
research institutes (Batelle, Stanford, Midwest, etc.), does “research in public interest.” Smith 
(1971, p. 35) noted that “essentially the contract research institutes are clinics of technology … 
which are useful to the public and profitable to sponsors.” Advisory corporations (Rand 
Hudson), the second type, work with federal agencies. The third type works on international 
issues with no government contracts and funding involved (e.g. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies). Another group of institutions investigates economic, political and social 
trends (i.e. the Institute for Policy Studies, Center for Research in Conflict Resolution). Other 
institutes conduct “systematic and comprehensive” studies of the future, some smaller 
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organizations specialize in regional and local issues, and some institutes are aimed at promoting 
knowledge and learning (Princeton, and others). Based on their scope, three of the seven groups 
are of special interest since they deal directly with policy issues. 
Donald Abelson suggested classifying think tanks based on their position on research and 
advocacy, their funding sources and their main target audiences. He started with three types 
described by Kent Weaver (1989) and added two more groups. Identified in Weaver’s work as 
universities without students, the first group of think tanks aims to promote a greater 
understanding of important social, economic, and political issues. These organizations are “at the 
top of the food chain of hierarchy of think tanks,” they are large, and usually composed of 
scholars primarily interested in research and writing (Abelson, 2006, p. 45). Government 
contractors and specialists (also Weaver’s term), such as RAND and the Urban Institute, shape 
their output in the form of advice and recommendations for their employer – the U.S. 
government. They enjoy greater access to federal departments and agencies, which (as Abelson 
illustrates with examples of RAND’s recommendations being ignored due to wishes and political 
concerns of Congress and the Executive) does not guarantee greater impact on policy. Advocacy 
think tanks are “the most common type of think tanks in the United States and other Western 
Democracies” (Abelson, 2006, p. 47). Their main purpose is to influence policymaking in a 
particular direction. They emphasize production of brief reports for policy-makers. Abelson’s 
fourth category is the vanity or candidate-based think tanks, which generate ideas for political 
candidates to draw on during campaigns. The last class, legacy think tanks, are created by 
“former presidents and cabinet secretaries intent on leaving their mark on public policy well after 
leaving office” (Abelson, 2006, p. 48). While trying to compare U.S. and Canadian think tanks, 
Abelson abandoned the two types he added to Weaver’s classification (Abelson, 2009, pp. 18-
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21). In his descriptions of the five different classes of think tanks, Abelson did not use all three 
factors that seemed to have formed the basis for the above classification. 
James McGann (2011, p. 19) describes four “ideal” types of think tanks (not dissimilar to 
those proposed by Abelson earlier): academic, contract researchers, advocacy think tanks, and 
party think tanks. He suggested that most think tanks are variations of these four.  McGann 
proposed looking separately at each think tank’s affiliations and then its culture, objectives, and 
interests served. According to the first criterion, he described seven groups of organizations, 
ranging from autonomous and independent to university- or party-affiliated, to for-profit. He 
further divided independent and affiliated think tanks into eight groups. However, McGann 
(2011b, p. 22) noted that “most think tanks do not fit neatly into any one category.”  
Organizations within the scope of this research were separate from policy makers and 
other unities – they were considered independent actors, along with the U.S. government and 
mass media, in the U.S. foreign policy. And while various classifications and definitions may 
include other types of organizations and groups, McGann’s vision of think tanks as “independent 
public-policy research organizations” was adopted for the purpose of this research: 
Think tanks, which function as public-policy research, analysis and 
engagement institutions, generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and 
advice on domestic and international issues, enabling policy-makers and 
the public to make informed decisions about public-policy issues. Think 
tanks may be affiliated with a political party, a university or government, 
or independent institutions that are structured as permanent bodies, not ad 
hoc commissions (McGann, 2010b, p. 1).  
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To further narrow our definition, the research deals with think tanks, or independent 
public-policy research organizations, which focus primarily on or influence significantly the U.S. 
foreign policy. The Methods chapter details the criteria used to select particular organizations for 
analysis. 
 
State of research on think tanks 
Several theoretical and conceptual approaches to think tanks were described in the 
literature. While there is no consensus on the exact role and impact of think tanks in policy 
process, most agree some influence takes place. 
Donald Abelson described four competing approaches to understanding think tanks 
(Abelson, 2006). Some scholars, he argued, treat think tanks as “elite organizations that rely on 
their expertise and close ties to policy-makers to advance the political and economic interests of 
corporate and philanthropic sponsors.” (Abelson, 2006, p. 97).  The “deeply rooted in the 
American pluralist tradition” (Abelson, 2006, p. 101) second approach does not reserve an 
exclusive place for think tanks and views them as similar among many other participants on the 
marketplace of ideas, such as trade unions, interest groups, environmental organizations and 
others. Within the third approach, which Abelson calls “statist” (Abelson, 2006, p. 103), think 
tanks and other non-governmental organizations have a modest place in the state decision-
making process. Though the influence of think tanks is acknowledged by the scholars advocating 
this latter approach, they emphasize the autonomy of the state in decision making. Lastly, 
Abelson described a group of three distinct approaches gathered under the umbrella of 
institutionalism. All three focus more on institutional structures of think tanks and their 
orientations, as opposed to their relationships with and influence on the state. 
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Scholars argue the superiority of some approaches over others. Thomas Medvetz (2012), 
for example, found both elitist and pluralist approaches flawed in their tendency to “prejudging” 
(Medvetz, 2012, p. 12) think tanks. He saw the clear advantage in utilizing the institutional 
approach since “the approach does not lock us into a tautological argument about what a think 
tank does” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 13).  
In his later works, Abelson offered a “new conceptual framework” (Abelson, 2009, p. 
58). He argued that think tanks differed too much in the goals and resources at their disposal in 
order for either of the above-mentioned frameworks (elitist, pluralist, statist, or institutional) to 
be accepted exclusively. Originating from the assumption that “not all organizations have the 
desire or the necessary resources to participate at each stage of the policy cycle: issue 
articulation, policy formulation, and policy implementation” his new concept suggested 
analyzing the impact of think tanks at different stages separately (Abelson, 2009, p. 59). Abelson 
offered taking advantage of different approaches depending on which of a think tank’s aspect or 
feature one tries to understand at the moment, but he urged scholars not to “…adhere rigorously 
to any one framework” (Abelson, 2012a, p. 30). He speculated that “foreign policy and the 
process by which decisions are made is complex and can rarely be explained by one theory” 
(Abelson, 2012a, p. 30). Attempts to measure and compare outputs produced by think tanks and 
effects engendered these approaches. 
As Murray Weidenbaum (2009, p. 87) noted, “surely, their [major think tanks] influence 
varies by organization, issue, and time period”. This influence is not easy to measure, due to 
difficulties with its operationalization (Abelson, 2004); complexity of the phenomena that the 
influence is aimed at, for example, public opinion, and climate of opinion (Sanders, 2009); and 
24 
 
difficulty in tracing origins of ideas “in an increasingly crowded political arena” (Abelson, 2009, 
p. 90). 
As was mentioned, many scholars and think tanks themselves consider news coverage as 
a valuable indicator of the potency of think tanks (Abelson, 1996, 2006, 2009; Ahmad, 2008; 
Krastev, 2001; McNutt & Marchildon, 2009; Rich, 2001, 2004; Rich & Weaver, 2000; Sanders, 
2009; Weidenbaum, 2009, 2010). Think tanks have a close relationship with news media, which 
is very valuable in their mission to propagate messages and e. 
 
Think tanks and mass media 
A few attempts were made to describe the close relationship between think tanks and 
mass media in more detail. Works of Donald Abelson and Howard Wiarda deserve special 
attention for they have gained popularity among think tanks scholars and are representative of 
the mainstream views of the issue. 
Abelson viewed the relationship between media and think tanks as symbiotic. By 
utilizing research and commentary from think tanks, the mass media “… are attempting to 
provide their audience with a more comprehensive understanding of complex political issues” 
(Abelson, 1996, p. 81), which should theoretically increase public awareness about these issues 
and thus aid mass media in fulfilling their main objective. In return, think tanks gain access to a 
channel of influence over public opinion and public policy. “At the very least,” Abelson 
speculated, “media exposure allows think tanks to plant seeds in the mind of the electorate that 
may develop into a full-scale public policy debate” (Abelson, 2009, pp. 85-86). While the actual 
influence is quite important for think tanks, Abelson (2006, p. 156) argued that it is “more 
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important, think tanks understand that media exposure creates the illusion of policy influence, a 
currency they have a vested interest in accumulating.” 
In other words think tanks gain not only a channel for influencing policy from news 
media exposure; they also build up their prestige and trustworthiness and gain visibility for 
themselves as well as for the people and organizations they represent. Abelson stresses the 
discrepancy in the news media goals to increase public awareness and the objectives think tanks 
pursue. The latter, in his view, were the more active players in this relationship, and influence 
balance between news media and think tanks looks rather unidirectional in this case.  He 
described tactics employed by think tanks in order to increase their media exposure, including 
taking steps to “flood the mainstream print media with hundreds of op-ed articles each year;” 
developing personal relationships with journalists, and spending millions of dollars on media and 
government relations (Abelson, 2009, p. 87) 22. 
Wiarda (2009), when discussing different parties involved in making U.S. foreign policy, 
assigned a more active role to the news media. He talked of yet another symbiosis involving 
media and government. Yet, again, the news media were in need of information and the 
informant was eager to use them to carry their own messages to the public. Wiarda (2009, p. 99) 
noted, “… the media now interpret the news and have themselves become regular participants in 
the drama.” The news media’s influence, in Wiarda’s opinion, was higher in 2009 than it had 
ever been. He talked in particular about the ability of the mass media to set the agenda, to “hype 
the news,” and their actual involvement in policy-making (Wiarda, 2009, p. 118).  
                                                 
 
22 According to the think tank’s annual report, The Heritage Foundation spent $11,378,839 on “media and 
government relations” ("Annual Report 2012," 2012), nearly 15% of its total operating expenses; one could assume 
that some of the $15,171,785 spent on fundraising in 2012 included mass communication-related expenditures. 
26 
 
At the same time, multiple factors impede the quality of foreign policy issues coverage 
by some news media. Professional practices, such as attempts at representing multiple positions 
on every issue, sometimes make nonviable, non-legitimate positions look like they have the same 
weight as educated consensus among policy makers. Wiarda provided some examples of 
possible scenarios as well: (1) transformations in the field - shrinking numbers of foreign 
correspondents, and the overload of journalists with “too much territory to cover” (Wiarda, 2009, 
p. 116); (2)  lack of expertise among professional journalists in issues they cover, their 
aggressive tactics and attempts to “ferret out sensitive information” (Wiarda, 2009, p. 115) -  
result in “foreign policy issues that U.S. citizens need to understand” being “… often ill-
reported, underreported, or not reported at all“ (Wiarda, 2006, p. 53). 
Wiarda went as far as offering a list of recommendations for foreign policy analysts on 
how to review and interpret news about foreign policy. In order to avoid misinformation, among 
other precautionary tactics, he recommended adopting skepticism toward news coverage, 
widening the circle of news sources, sorting out biased authors, and being aware of media bias 
and incomplete, oversimplified analyses. 
While considering news media a more active element of foreign policy building, along 
with the public, interest groups, think tanks, and of course, government institutions, Wiarda also 
described the relationship between media and think tanks as unidirectional. Think tanks, or as he 
called them, “powerhouses,” use mass media actively to extend their influence on policy 
formation. Being readily available, while “...their offices in Washington are practically next to 
the television studios” (Wiarda, 2008, p. 110), think tanks are a cheap (read ‘free’) source of 
expertise, polarized views, and borrowed credibility for journalists. 
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While both Abelson and Wiarda discuss mainly one side of the relationship between 
think tanks and news media, in which media are presented as mere channel for messages 
produced by think tanks, there are reasons to assume that there is more to this association. For 
one, the news media control the mass communication channels think tanks are eager to get 
access to. And, as discussed in the next section, they also play a rather active role in foreign 
policy.  
 
News media and foreign policy 
Bernard Cohen’s work was the first scholarly attempt to undertake “systematic 
explorations of the relationships of the press and foreign policy” (Cohen, 1963, p. 3). Driven by 
the assumption that people in a democratic system need to be informed by independent media in 
order to be able to make sound decisions, he attempted to evaluate the ability of the nation’s free 
press to cope with this task. While the main goal of his research was to assess the quality of the 
work of news media with regard to the U.S. foreign policy, Cohen also conceptualized the 
functions of news media in the foreign policy process.  The press, he inferred from interviews 
with correspondents and representatives of the Executive branch and the Congress, carried out 
three major roles in foreign policy formulation and implementation: the observer, participant, 
and catalyst roles. As a rather active participant in the process, the press realizes its main impact 
on foreign policy through the function of “map-making.” In unison with Walter Lippmann’s idea 
of human reality being “pictures in our heads” based on the information we have (Lippmann, 
1922), Cohen (1963, p. 13)  suggested that “…if we don’t see a story in the newspapers (or catch 
it on radio or television), it effectively has not happened so far as we are concerned.” Foreign 
policy coverage, determined by many factors, including discrepancies in the goals and visions of 
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journalists and the government, ends up being “spasmodic, piecemeal, impressionistic, and 
oversimplified, sometimes inaccurate or garbled, and generally failing to deal with policy issues 
until they have become matters of public record” Cohen (1963, p. 267) concluded. The nature of 
interactions between policymakers and the press can force the news coverage to close on itself, 
when, in the absence of reports from their sources and new occurrences, journalists’ questions 
are stimulated solely by previous coverage. As an almost exclusive source of information for 
“pictures in our heads,” the press, Cohen argued, “… may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). The latter is essentially the substance of the main hypothesis for the 
Maxwell McCombs’ and Donald Shaw’s agenda-setting theory, discussed in a later section of 
this dissertation. 
Patrick O’Heffernan (1991) elaborated further on the idea of media-created reality almost 
three decades after Cohen’s first major empirical exploration of mass media role in U.S. foreign 
policy. O’Heffernan (1991, p. xi) tried to find out “how do the mass media shape the political 
dimension of the world?” In his evaluation of the role news media played in politics, he analyzed 
interviews (both quantitative and in-depth) with officials, reviewed archival documents and 
assembled case studies from news broadcasts. Like Cohen, O’Heffernan drew a picture of a very 
active news media involvement in foreign policy. He argued that news media take initiative in 
foreign policy formulation and execution and supported this statement with anecdotal evidence 
of media directly affecting policy outputs.  The news media, he said, also have control over “… 
shape, tone, and emphasis of U.S. foreign policy… .” (O'Heffernan, 1991, p. 6). While exposing 
more people to foreign policy-related news (which was made possible with advances of 
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technology and other factors), news media encourage more players to join in the process – 
foreign policy acquires more of a domestic flavor. 
While development of American news as a profit-driven business enterprise stimulated 
the evolution of high spread communication technology, foreign policymakers have had to adjust 
to the speeds of information delivery and pick up the pace of work. Diplomats can no longer 
enjoy the luxury of extra time in preparing their communiqués – expectation of fast information 
delivery applies across the board. Simultaneously, acquiring and disseminating information has 
become increasingly easier, which gives many involved parties (foreign governments, 
businesses, terrorist groups, etc.) access to information through news media before anything 
reaches them through diplomatic communication channels. New groups, like the wider public, 
now enjoy access to this information as well, since it is no longer in the exclusive domain of 
diplomatic communication. In short, selected news media make information consumers more 
aware of foreign policy, determine which aspects of external relations will have a chance to 
become a part of public agenda, and they force policy makers to adjust for new audiences. 
O'Heffernan (1991, p. 97) went so far as developing the “Insider model of media-influenced 
foreign policy” in which “media simultaneously occupy a location in all of the policy process’ 
inner circles and operate outside of the circles to influence actors on the inside.”  
One could argue that such views are outdated. Advances in technology, changing national 
and international legal frameworks, as well as shifts of powers and priorities on both national and 
international political arenas could drastically change the set of players and nature of interactions 
in foreign policy. Even if Cohen and O’Heffernan were right in their observations twenty and 
fifty years ago respectively, things could look quite differently in the future. A more recent 
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inquiry into the issue by Robert Entman (Entman, 2000, 2004) would not allow one to be so 
dismissive of their ideas. 
Entman (2004, p. 95) suggested that the end of the Cold War made the foreign policy 
environment more complex and enabled players other than presidents to affect the process by 
“… liberating journalists – and elites and citizens – from the habits of Cold War thinking.” The 
problem in the international arena (communist aggression and world- conquering admission) and 
its cause (communist ideology) used to be clear and virtually singular. The solution rested with 
the ideological counterpart – the democratic world, and, Entman (2004, p. 95) argued, “virtually 
any problematic situation that arose in the world could be, and was, assimilated to the Cold War 
paradigm.”  New issues, like September 11 and the U.S. government’s reaction to it, shifted the 
foci and the corollary of defining issues and solutions. In addition, proliferation of new 
technology allowed for more independent construction of frames: while it is more difficult to 
reframe an issue verbally, it is arguably easier to do so with images as a source of information 
and a part of a message. And while the news media’s ability to influence foreign policy would 
fluctuate, depending on the position and actions of current administrations, they remain a 
powerful independent player in foreign policy formation and implementation. 
News media create images in our heads (Lippmann, 1922), tell us what to think about and 
map our political world (Cohen, 1963), determine our political reality, and penetrate all stages of 
foreign policy process (O'Heffernan, 1991), while the political environment seems to be 
becoming increasingly supportive of their active involvement (Entman, 2000). And while a great 
deal of empirical and anecdotal evidence illustrates a very active mass media role in foreign 
policy formation and implementation, descriptions of the unidirectional relationship between 
news media and think tanks found in existing literature seem to be ignoring this active position 
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of news media and keep describing them as the tools used by think tanks. Great ‘grey areas’ in 
research on think tanks in U.S foreign policy are apparent. 
 
News media and foreign policy agenda-setting 
Think tanks are recognized as influential players in the foreign policy arena, and so are 
the news media, which affect policymakers and other actors involved in the foreign policy 
process (NGOs, policy makers, congressmen, public, terrorists, corporations, and foreign 
governments). While influencing other participants in the foreign policy processes, news media 
are likely to affect think tanks as well. Various mechanisms of news media involvement in 
foreign policy have been described in the literature, as alluded to in the previous section, and 
agenda-setting remains the most significant. 
Agenda-setting started as and remains traditionally bound to the study of salience of (or 
attention to) issues in mass media and public agendas (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). However, 
attempts were made to extrapolate the basic assumptions of the theory (media telling the public 
what to think about) onto other potentially influenced entities: organizations, opinion leaders, 
and decision makers. In particular, research shows that media can affect the agendas of 
policymakers and decision makers alike. 
For example, in a study of the Belgian government, parliament and media, Walgrave, 
Soroka, and Nuytemans (2008) found that the media affect the choice of topics and their salience 
among policy makers in what they called a closed political system, where “political parties have 
a great deal of control over the political agenda” (Walgrave et al., 2008, p. 816). Another team of 
researchers examined previous agenda-setting studies and found that conclusions about the 
degree to which news media can influence political agendas depends largely on the methods 
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employed in a particular research design. Regardless of the measurement of effects, they 
concluded “mass media do set the political agenda to some extent” (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 
2011, p. 306) By surveying parliamentarians, they learned that European policymakers 
themselves perceive media as very influential in their decision-making. 
In a country such as the United States, where politicians pay close attention to a great 
variety of outside factors, such as public opinion, interest groups, political parties, individual 
policy entrepreneurs, and the mass media (Jones, 2005, pp. 90-92), evidence drives scholars to 
recognize that news media influence policy in general and the foreign policy agenda in 
particular. In his study of U.S. and U.K. opinion polls, as well as data from the American 
National Election Study, Soroka (2003) found a strong connection between public opinion, 
media agendas and foreign policy, arguing that their interplay affects policy agenda greatly. 
Evidence of the news media’s ability to influence directly not only the public agenda but 
also policy makers dates back to Cook et al. (1983). In an experimental study they interviewed a 
sample of policy makers before and after investigative stories they knew from journalists were 
about to be published or broadcast. They conducted a series of surveys after either exposing 
representatives of the general public to experimental content or making an effort to prevent them 
from watching the program. The research team was trying to gauge and isolate public opinion 
change, which was shown in a number of other studies (Burstein, 1998; Page & Shapiro, 1983; 
Soroka, 2003) to affect the agenda of policymakers. Their combined analysis of interviews with 
policy makers and the change in public opinion data showed that news media were capable of 
affecting policy directly, not only via their impact on public opinion. In a later study, Edwards 
and Wood (1999) found that “most of the time the president reacts, responding primarily to 
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fluctuations in media attention and world events,” thus providing additional evidence of news 
media’s direct impact on foreign policy makers. 
Wood and Peake (1998) found that, when it comes to foreign policy issues, news media 
attention affected the presidential agenda (at least its public component), while the opposite, the 
president affecting the foci of news media, did not hold true. Wood and Peake were among the 
first researchers to look at foreign policy, as opposed to domestic policy issues traditionally 
targeted in agenda-setting studies. The president is the central figure in U.S. foreign policy 
process. However, he does not have full control over issue salience in the field, nor does he seem 
to remain unaffected by “continually unfolding international drama” production, the 
interpretation of which is in the hands of the mass media (Wood & Peake, 1998, p. 182). 
While the research was concerned with more salient issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the Bosnian Conflict, and relationships with the Soviet Union, Peake’s more recent study (2001) 
found that in dealing with less salient issues, presidents could be successful agenda-setters. Their 
ability to affect levels of congressional and news media attention to salient issues, on the other 
hand, is insignificant. A more recent study supports the idea of issue-determined, situational 
presidential agenda-setting powers, this time, affecting Congress (Rutledge & Larsen Price, 
2014). And another study conducted by Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha (2008) found that a 
president’s ability to influence salience of issues via presidential TV addresses depends 
substantially on outside factors, including previous news coverage. 
Think tanks could be providing another avenue for news media to affect foreign policy 
agendas by creating an agenda-setting chain reaction. Similar to the way in which changes in 
public opinion are reflected in policy agendas, changes in think tank foci may be directing the 
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attention of policymakers to certain topics. To begin the exploration of such possibilities, one 
first has to assess the impact of media content on think tank foci. 
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Chapter 3. 
Theoretical framework and Research Questions 
 
Research on political agenda formation within the agenda-setting tradition will serve as a 
starting point in exploring sources of influence on the research and advocacy foci of think tanks. 
This dissertation tests the assumptions underlying the agenda-setting theory by comparing 
patterns in attention to foreign countries and foreign policy topics in national news and in content 
published by think tanks on their websites. 
 
Agenda-setting theory 
The origins of the agenda-setting theory are traceable to Walter Lippmann’s theories on 
the mass media’s role in the formation of political reality. The political world, and even more so 
the world of foreign policy, “is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind,” and the information we 
have to build our knowledge and perception of with comes from mass media (Lippmann, 1922, 
p. 29). According to this logic, since “whatever we believe to be true picture, we treat as if it 
were the environment itself,” news media are capable of building our political reality by 
providing pictures to believe (or not) in (Lippmann, 1922, p. 10). Cohen, and others who agreed 
with him, base a good deal of their research on this assumption, with some clarifications to it, of 
course. 
Cohen (1963) posited that the media are not always successful in telling people what to 
think. Instead, they successfully tell audiences what to think about. Maxwell McCombs and 
Donald Shaw (1972) set out to test this by analyzing issue priorities among 1968 presidential 
election voters and mass media coverage in the corresponding period. They claimed to have 
found enough support for Cohen’s assumption in their data, to conclude that journalists, editors, 
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newsroom staff, and broadcasters alike play an essential role in shaping our political reality by 
choosing what is news and what is to be presented to audiences.  
Further research provided additional detailed information addressing the agenda-setting 
process, such as nuance and the peculiarities of agenda-setting at its different stages; awareness 
of the general issue; awareness of proposed solution and specific knowledge about the proposals 
(Benton & Frazier, 1976). Additionally, scholars learned of the inclusion of elements of public 
decision-making in deciding what to accept as the public agenda-setting factors, such as amount 
of exposure and audience’s personal characteristics and background becoming important 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1978). 
However, the main role in providing the choices still belongs to news media. Their power 
remains undeniable for agenda-setting scholars: “the press is far more than a conduit for the 
concerns and issues of others… it reworks and retranslates them. The mass media both focus 
attention and structure our cognitions” (McCombs & Shaw, 1978, p. 151). McCombs and others 
expanded on the role of the audience in the agenda-setting process. They attempted to integrate 
some media gratification studies into their theoretical framework, showing a connection between 
different information seeking motives and resulting differences in agenda-setting effects 
(McCombs & Weaver, 1985). And while real world events, and politicians may take part in 
forming news agendas, and publics may get to choose which ideas to subscribe to, news media 
have the last word in selecting what is to be disseminated to their audiences (McCombs, 2004). 
Concurrently with the development of agenda-setting theories, more groundbreaking 
research was being carried out on the process of political agenda building. In a different subfield 
of social science, from a different perspective, Cobb and Elder (1971) used the term "agenda-
building" to describe the interplay of government, news media, and publics in the process of 
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political agenda formation. A more complex set of assumptions incorporating the idea of 
reciprocity, as opposed to a unidirectional influence of news media over their audiences, began 
taking shape. Cobb and his colleagues (R. Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 1976) went so far as to describe 
different types of political agendas (public agenda and official agenda) and speculated  about the 
influence of reciprocity among the agenda's on political climate. If an issue has reached a certain 
level of development in the public agenda, and has not yet made its way to the official agenda, 
one should expect a good amount of dissatisfaction among the publics, they suggested. 
In the absence of empirical data to back it up and with no clear statements of causal 
relationships, agenda building is not necessarily a theory that could be used to frame the research 
for this dissertation. However, the idea of reciprocity of agendas, which supports the main 
assumptions of agenda building, provides a basis for possible explanation of the connection 
between think tanks and national news agendas and their combined (and/or mutually reinforced) 
impact on U.S. foreign policy. 
In fact agenda-setting research in U.S. foreign policy has assumed, and found evidence 
of, the possibility that participants other than news media could become active agenda setters. 
Though the first systematic explorations of foreign policy agenda-setting (Wood & Peake, 1998) 
did not yield much evidence of reciprocity between media and presidential agendas (while 
providing more evidence of news agenda’s ability to influence issue salience), later research 
found that, under certain circumstances, other players could affect news media attention. So, for 
example, Edwards and Wood (1999, p. 342), while showing that “…most of the time presidents 
react, responding primarily to fluctuations in attention by the media and, in the area of foreign 
policy, world events,” they also found evidence that “If an issue is not already part of ongoing 
media coverage or congressional hearings, then the president may be able to set the agenda of the 
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networks and Congress.” Peake (2001, p. 83) showed that “…the President substantially impacts 
media and congressional attention to foreign policy issues” on issues enjoying relatively low 
levels of salience. When it comes to defense issues, number of congressional hearings on a topic 
seem to affect the amount of news coverage they get, while agendas of these two active agenda 
setters appear to be reciprocal on international relations issues (Tan & Weaver, 2007). While it is 
likely that salience of international affairs issues in congressional hearings is highly affected by 
the amount of attention the president pays to them (Rutledge & Larsen Price, 2014), the foreign 
policy agenda-setting scene displays several distinctive characteristics that informed the 
hypotheses of this research and informed the elaborated the possible role of think tanks in 
foreign policy agenda-setting and research needed to clarify that role. First, agenda-setting in 
foreign policy is not always unidirectional: depending on issue salience and its nature, different 
players may have better chances at affecting agendas of others. Second, reciprocal relationships 
between agendas of individual players take place in foreign policy agenda-setting. And third, 
foreign policy agenda-setting could work as in a multi-step process, which is important in 
understanding the ways in which think tanks could be affecting policymakers. 
 
Levels of agenda-setting effects 
It is important to note that, since its conception in 1972, agenda-setting theory grew to 
include a variety of effects and developed explanations (and tests) for effects at multiple levels. 
Object agenda-setting and attribute agenda-setting, the first two most researched levels, are what 
agenda-setting research normally deals with. 
At the first levels of agenda-setting, salience of issues (or, in McCombs’ terms, objects) 
is transferred from the mass media to the public, or in our case, hypothetically, onto think tanks: 
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“The object is that thing towards which our attention is directed or the thing about which we 
have an attitude or opinion” (McCombs, 2004, pp. 69-70). As such, this research uses countries – 
possible foci of foreign policy effort and think tank interest. Even though traditionally public 
issues have been used to test agenda-setting theory, virtually anything can serve as an object of 
attention, and foreign nations have successfully been used as a unit of analysis to test agenda-
setting effects of international news (Wanta et al., 2004). 
Second-level, or attribute, agenda-setting is an expansion of the understating of media 
agenda-setting effects. As McCombs (2004, p. 71) wrote, when the salience of object attributes 
are transferred from the media agenda “…the media not only tell us what to think about, but they 
also tell us how to think about some objects.” While attribute agenda-setting deals with deeper 
levels of influence and is closely connected with the concept of framing, it is important not to 
confuse the two notions. To put it in McCombs’ (2004, p. 88) language, “a frame is an attribute 
of the object under consideration because it describes the object. However, not all attributes are 
frames.” A frame is a “very specific case of attributes” usually understood as a dominant 
perspective about an object (McCombs 2004, p. 88). Detection of the attribute agenda-setting 
effects on the foci of research and advocacy activities conducted by think tanks would indicate a 
very significant level of their dependence on news media in decision-making. However, object 
agenda-setting effects have to be found before one can talk about any connection. 
 
Research hypotheses 
Agenda-setting, at any level, states that there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship 
between the salience of objects (or attributes) in news media coverage and on public agendas. In 
order to show such a relationship, research results have to show a significant level of correlation 
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between the cause and the effect, while the cause must precede the effect in time. These 
conditions were applied to the test of causal relationships between news coverage and content 
published by think tanks online.  
Additionally, considering current foreign policy agenda-setting literature, this research is 
looking for bi-directional relationships. Causality was assumed to have been reversed for topics 
of relatively low salience and think tanks were assumed to be active agenda setters. If the 
connection between media and think tank content is established, the causality will be tested in 
both directions. 
H1. There is a positive correlation between the salience of selected countries in The New 
York Times and The Washington Post news coverage and salience of these countries in 
the content published on websites of leading think foreign policy tanks. 
H2. News media coverage leads the attention of think tanks to more salient countries. 
H3. For countries less salient in news coverage, attention to them from think tanks leads 
news coverage. 
Using time series analysis techniques described in next chapter, this dissertation tests 
these hypotheses in an attempt to determine the presence and direction of agenda-setting effects 
between news media and U.S. foreign policy think tanks, and to address the two major objectives 
of this dissertation: explore a new field of media effects and open a new chapter in the 
exploration of foreign policy agenda-setting research by adding think tanks to the classic set of 
influential entities in the process. 
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Chapter 4. 
Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the approach to data and analysis in this dissertation’s research. It 
begins by addressing the definition and measurement of the critical variable for the agenda-
setting research, salience. Multiple approaches address the question differently, depending on 
research questions, groups compared in particular studies, as well the researcher’s understanding 
of agenda-setting as a phenomenon. It explains the selection of the unit of analysis and the 
organizations relevant to this exploratory study. While the research deals with written sources of 
different type across the content published by think tanks online (commentary, research papers, 
reports, events descriptions, etc.) and news coverage (news stories, editorials, blog entries), 
content was not further parceled out, as structural elements of publication units differ greatly. 
Measures were taken to increase the likelihood of detecting thought relationships between the 
content published online by think tanks and news coverage. More influential think tanks were 
chosen for the analysis. The period where their influence is more likely to occur was considered. 
News organizations likely to lead national agenda were analyzed and objects likely to propagate 
the national news agenda were chosen for the analysis. Corresponding subsections explain the 
thinking behind this selection process in more detail. Lastly, the chapter describes the approach 
to data, which was treated as times series. Its analysis took into account the possibility of 
autocorrelation in times series variables. 
 
Salience measurement 
The measurement of salience of objects in news coverage (regularly, the main 
independent variable in agenda-setting research) and their attributes is essential for agenda-
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setting research (McCombs, 2005). Gauging salience traditionally has been achieved by means 
of determining the number of stories about the objects of study23 over time (Dearing, 1996; 
Rogers, Dearing, & Bregman, 1993). Often, more data is recorded and analyzed in these studies 
to provide additional information about different aspects of agenda-setting and/or related 
phenomena. While the exact understanding of salience as a concept varies in academic literature, 
the term is often synonymous with importance, popularity, concern, awareness, attention. It is 
sometimes associated with interest, relevance, awareness, conspicuousness, and involvement 
(Kiousis, 2004). The amount of recorded detail about stories and mentions of objects varies 
depending on research goals. The conceptual framework employed in a particular study ranges 
from a simple count (where all news stories, editorial pieces or blog entries in print media, or all 
segments in broadcast, mentioning the object24 are equally counted and added up) to more 
complex procedures, where the amount of attention paid to the object within a story/broadcast 
segment is measured and recorded, along with the prominence of the story – gauged sometimes 
by its length and position in a print issue or broadcast25 (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Because 
salience, a crucial concept in research, has a wide spectrum of interpretations, it is important to 
define salience as it is understood in this study. 
Developed by Spiro Kiousis (2004), the conceptual model of media salience organizes its 
measurements into three core structural elements of the salience phenomenon: attention, 
prominence, and valence. Attention to objects, the most common approach to measuring their 
                                                 
 
23 More generally, objects, in McCombs’ terms.  
24 Or an attribute of an object, if second-level agenda-setting effects are being studied. 
25 The original agenda-setting study (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) divided the analyzed news media content 
into “major” and “minor” levels based on position and space devoted to printed news stories and position and time 
allowed for broadcast materials. 
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salience, is “usually gauged by the sheer volume of stories or space dedicated to topics…”  
(Kiousis, 2004, p. 74). The basic approach to gauging this volume, where “the number of news 
stories [mentioning the object] measures the relative salience of an issue of study on the media 
agenda” (Dearing, 1996, p. 18), has been, Kiousis argues, implemented by most scholars. 
Prominence, described as “the positioning of a story within a media text to communicate 
its importance” (Kiousis, 2004, p. 74) is extrapolated from the presence of issue on front pages of 
newspapers (also in the beginning of news sections in magazines or in lead editorial columns in 
editorial pages)26, and its mention in a “prestigious news source” (Kiousis, 2004, p. 75).  Due to 
their “elite” status and ability to affect agendas of “non-elite media,” use of The New York Times 
and The Washington Post as go-to sources for measurement of salience of objects in national news 
coverage, Kiousis argues, is rooted in the idea of prominence, which “… enhance[s] 
generalizability of using data from these [The New York Times and The Washington Post] news 
outlets” (Kiousis, 2004, p. 75). 
Valence, an “affective element of news” (Kiousis, 2004, p. 75), is measured by estimating 
the amount of conflict in a story (the more conflict, the higher the salience) and looking at the 
story’s tone27. Though included in Kiousis’ model and used by other researchers in 
measurements of salience in studies of first-level agenda-setting effects28 (Mutz, 1998), concepts 
                                                 
 
26 This is essentially what McCombs and Shaw (1972) did in their foundational agenda-setting research. 
They, however, used length of television stories to assign them into the same “major” coverage category as the 
prominent print stories and editorials. Length of a television news segment is, in Kiousis’ conceptual model, a 
potential characteristic of attention, not prominence. Before outlining the elements of his conceptual model, Kiousis 
(2004, p. 74) warns the reader that “… there is certainly overlap” and that the three indicators of salience in his 
model (attention, pominece and valience) are not nesessarrily “distinclty separate.”  
27 Two main approaches to estimating the contribution of the story tone to its salience suggest either 
counting all non-neutral (either positive or negative stories) as salient or counting negative stories only (Kiousis, 
2004). 
28 Media telling public what to think about. 
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united under the valence umbrella (such as positive or negative tone, coverage of sides in a 
conflict) are traditionally associated with the research on second-level29 agenda-setting 
(McCombs, 2004) and framing (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) studies. 
While Kiousis argues that all three types of measures (attention, prominence, and 
valence) are important for an accurate measurement of salience, his own exploratory empirical 
tests did not include indicators for all three30. Although the factor analysis in his study showed 
valence measures explaining 28% of variance in the sample, some of this explanatory power 
overlapped with the visibility factor31. Explanatory power (53% of variance) of the visibility 
factor and the overlap of valence factor dimensions with the former, prompted Kiousis to 
conclude that “conventional use of story frequency to represent media salience has been 
generally appropriate” (Kiousis, 2004, p. 81). 
While the measurements for valence as a contributor to media salience have not been 
fully developed (Kiousis, 2004), more tests are also needed to establish their impact on salience. 
There is no substantive reason to suggest that valence indicators (if found at all32) would 
contribute to the measurement of object salience in think tank publications. While prominence of 
an object in news coverage could be assessed from its position in a publication, volume of the 
story or length of a broadcast segment, the same may not apply to the content produced by think 
                                                 
 
29 Media telling people what to think. 
30 He gathered news stories from The New York Times coverage, which limited the sample to prominent (at 
least according to one or prominence criteria) content only. 
31 Kiousis mentions that Manheim (1986) “collapsed attention and prominence into the category of 
visibility”  (Kiousis, 2004, p. 74), and uses the term “visibility” to label a factor, uniting attention and some 
prominence indicators.  
32 While think tanks have generation of “policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice” (McGann, 2010b, 
p. 1) as their mission, output they publish on their websites is expected to be neutral in tone. Objectivity requirement 
of scientific inquiries (Reiss & Sprenger, 2014) leaves very little room in research-based publications for negative or 
positive incarnations in tone, as well as conflict, as understood in news reporting. 
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tanks. Considering Kiousis’ assessment of story frequencies as an appropriate measure of 
salience, this dissertation’s main emphasis on attention to objects and the need to collect 
comparable data from both news media and think tanks, valence and prominence indicators were 
not included in salience measurements. Salience of objects was represented by the number of 
stories, blog entries, and editorial pieces mentioning them in news coverage and by the number 
of published online analysis pieces, activities, reports, and other content for think tanks. 
 
Unit of analysis 
Print newspaper content (news stories, editorial and op-ed pieces) and web-based 
publications (pieces appearing on news media websites only) were treated equally in the 
assessment of object salience in news coverage. Considering the important role blogs have in 
setting news-agenda (Campbell, Gibson, Gunter, & Touri, 2009) and direct association of media-
sponsored blogs with respective news organizations (i.e. www.blogs.nytimes.com, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs), blog entries mentioning the object were counted in 
measuring its salience as well. A single publication (news story, editorial, blog entry) was treated 
as a unit of analysis. 
According to Abelson (2012b, p. 2), “regardless of how different types and generations of 
think tanks promote themselves, they understand all too well the importance of building a public 
profile.” In their effort to establish their public profile, think tanks, along with other activities33, 
post key information about their work online. Like other institutions, Carnegie Endowment for 
                                                 
 
33 According to Abelson, in pursuit of a stronger public profile, think tanks also organize forums, encourage 
their fellows to give public lectures, testify before Congress, publish books, journals and reports, and enhance their 
media exposure. They keep record of these activities and post online written content, transcripts and descriptions of 
events.  
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International Peace and Brookings Institution place on their websites reports, research notes, 
policy recommendations, opinion and editorial pieces, interviews, testimonies, lectures, and 
other proof of their work. While important as an illustration of their productivity and as a tool of 
increasing media exposure (Abelson, 2012b), the diverse published online content serves as a 
good indicator of the agendas of think tanks. Similar to the way in which it was measured in 
news agenda, salience was determined as the number of pieces published online mentioning the 
object. While prominence measures were not included in this study34, all website publications 
had equal weight in the salience rate of an object. 
 
Leading think tanks 
A variety of organizations, including think tanks themselves and the Civil Societies 
Program at the University of Pennsylvania, rank think tanks and keep track of their performance. 
Selection of the think tanks for the dissertation research was based on their prominence in the 
field of U.S. foreign policy. The Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace were selected for their top ranking in the Think Tanks & Civil Societies 
Program’s 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (McGann, 2015). The report suggests 
they are the most influential in U.S. foreign policy think tanks. 
Brookings Institution describes itself as “a nonprofit public policy organization based in 
Washington, DC” with a mission to “…conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on 
that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations…” (Brookings Institution, n.d.-
a). The organization was recognized as the top think tank in the world by the above mentioned 
                                                 
 
34 See previous section of this chapter 
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Think tanks & Civil Society program in seven consecutive annual reports between 2008 and 
2015 (McGann, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2014, 2015) and named among 30 
(alphabetically arranged) top think tanks in the world in the very first 2007 Go to Think Tanks 
Report (McGann, 2007). Since the  introduction in 2013 report of the Foreign Policy and 
International Affairs category, Brookings Institution has held the top position in in it (McGann, 
2014, 2015). 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CE) is a “unique global network of 
policy research centers” aimed “to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development 
of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in 
government, business, and civil society” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.-a). 
CE was the second ranked foreign policy and international affairs think tank in 2013 Got to 
Think Tanks report (McGann, 2014) and third in the latest 2014 report (McGann, 2015). 
Unlike the case of the national news agenda, there is no substantive reason to assume that 
a shared think tank agenda exists. Thus the content of each think tank was coded into separate 
variables and treated as individual time series. 
 
Leading news media and the national news agenda 
While a multitude of factors affect formation agendas of individual news outlets, 
determining (McCombs, 2004) and even predicting (Atkinson, Lovett, & Baumgartner, 2014) a 
universal national news agenda is possible from relatively small samples. McCombs (2004, p. 
113) argued that certain “elite” media set the tone for other news outlets, in what he called the 
“intermedia agenda-setting” process and contemporary research finds more support for his 
argument (B. E. Denham, 2014; Golan, 2006). The Washington Post and The New York Times 
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are often considered as such elite intermedia agenda-setters, which is why they have been 
selected for this study. As Kiousis (2004) argues, one can reliably sample these news outlets in a 
measurement of national news agenda. However, intermedia agenda-setting is not the only 
determinant of national news agenda35.  Regardless of particular conditions making the existence 
of a national news agenda possible, there are regularities in news coverage by individual outlets 
that hint at the existence of the national news agenda. 
 
Selecting objects potentially representative of national news agenda 
Recent research illustrates that, in certain cases, using only a few (or even a single) news 
organizations’ coverage to assess salience of objects on national news agenda is justified 
(Atkinson et al., 2014).  According to the findings from Atkinson et al. study, as long as an 
object is highly salient and experiences a spike in attention in one national news source, it is very 
likely to do so in the rest. Salience in this study was understood as “the number of monthly news 
articles” (Atkinson et al., 2014, p. 272) and the attention spike was defined as “as the difference 
between the maximum value [monthly count of stories] and the mean [over the test period], 
divided by the mean.” In order to improve the representativeness of the national news agenda by 
the coverage from The New York Times (NYT) and The Washington Post (WP), highly salient 
objects, and objects experiencing spikes were selected for analysis. 
Such objects were first identified in NYT coverage using the LexisNexis search engine 
over 12 months of 2011 – the beginning of the research time period (see justification of the 
                                                 
 
35 According to McCombs (2004), beside other news organizations, journalism’s norms and traditions, 
major sources of information have major impacts on formation of national news agenda, with national leaders and 
public relations professionals contributing to the process as well. 
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period in the next section of this chapter). According to McCombs (2004, p. 69), an object is 
“that thing towards which our attention is directed” and “the kinds of objects that can define an 
agenda in the media and among the public are virtually limitless” (McCombs 2004, p. 70). This 
dissertation uses countries as objects of attention. The initial set of keywords for news content 
searches was based on the United Nations geographical regions and their composition (Division, 
2013). Searches were conducted using 238 country names and major capitals, sometimes used as 
synonyms for some countries’ governments (i.e. Official Moscow).  
Searches for several objects produced very high numbers of false hits that did not 
mention target countries. A more complex search logic was applied in these cases to ensure 
clarity, so, for example, if one searched for “Georgia,” stories related to the country in the 
Caucasus and not the American state would be counted. The false hit stories were analyzed in 
order to determine search words to be excluded from LexisNexis search terms36. Similarly, 
“Jordan” could refer to a country but is also commonly used as a name. Some countries (like 
Guinea-Bissau, French Guiana, Papua New Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea) had 
elements (or the entirety) of another country’s name in their designation, which required 
specifications in search terms37 as well38. 
Searches in The New York Times’ coverage for 2539 out of 238 countries and territories in 
the initial list generated more than 1000 hits, indicating these countries as more salient (and thus 
                                                 
 
36 In the example of Georgia, the search term ended up excluding major cities in Georgia, USA, as well as 
popular in the U.S. sports: Georgia or Yerevan or Saakashvili AND NOT Atlanta AND NOT Savanna AND NOT 
Augusta AND NOT Marietta AND NOT Columbus AND NOT football AND NOT basketball AND NOT baseball. 
37 For complete list of search terms refer to Appendix A 
38 For example, Guinea, the country, had to be distinguished by means of excluding exact names of another 
four states from the search term: Guinea AND NOT "Guinea-Bissau" AND NOT "French Guiana" AND NOT 
"Papua New Guinea" AND NOT "Equatorial Guinea" 
39 See Appendix B. 
50 
 
more likely to be found on national news agenda) objects.  Atkinson et al. (2014, p. 374) found 
that two factors explain approximately 90 percent of a topic’s likelihood to become a part of 
national news agenda: salience and “attention spikes.” The strength of attention spikes was 
estimated for the coverage of the 25 salient objects, which narrowed the list to 5 countries: 
Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Libya, Greece, and Japan had a spike in attention higher than .840. 
Japan, the object with the 6th largest spike, was added the list as well, while experiencing a 
smaller spike of .69, had salience higher than that of the first 5 high-spike countries. 
An attention spike represents a singular noticeable increase in coverage, followed by a 
drop, within a short period of time. If multiple spikes occur during a prolonged period, the 
individual spike’s strength would be reduced by the fact that each of the spikes would affect the 
average salience and thus minimize the difference between the maximum number of stories in a 
month and the average. 
In the hypothetical situation in Table 1, country A and country B follow the same pattern 
in coverage, except for the fact that country A experienced one spike in attention in news 
coverage and country B had two, and country C experienced a prolonged increase in attention. 
While country B went through attention spikes as high as the one country A had, its spike value 
[(max - mean)/mean] is lower. Country C has the highest of the three in salience and the increase 
in attention to it is obvious. However, its spike value is the lowest. 
  
                                                 
 
40 Among the 25 more salient countries, spike values ranged from 0.21 for Mexico to 1.34 for Egypt. See 
Appendix C for the full list. 
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Table 1. Hypothetical illustration of lower detectability of multiple spikes or gradual increases in 
attention. 
Country / 
Coverage 
month 
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Salience 
(monthly 
average) 
Spike Relative 
standard 
deviation 
A 8 8 7 6 25 5 6 9 1.69 75.57 
B  8 8 25 6 25 5 6 12 1.11 76.28 
C 8 12 16 20 24 28 24 19 0.48 38.17 
 
 
The attention spike measure, due to its mathematical nature, only accounts for a singular 
strong increase in attention over analyzed period (Atkinson et al., 2014, p. 372). Accordingly, 
additional measures were introduced to include research objects with multiple attention spikes. 
Standard deviation (or average distance of individual data points from the mean) could 
serve as a good indicator of multiple attention spikes. However, due to significant differences 
between average monthly numbers of hits among searches for various countries, within the 
selected group of 25 most salient (950 for UK on one end and 86 for Hong Kong on the other), 
standard deviations expressed in absolute values would be incomparable. Relative standard 
deviation proved a more suitable coefficient of variation in this case. In the hypothetical situation 
depicted in Table 1, country B has two significant spikes. Its spike value is lower than that of 
country A (which only has one spike), however, its relative standard deviation value is higher. 
In our subsample of 25 most salient countries, five countries with the highest attention 
spikes also had the highest relative standard deviation (RSD) values.  Iran, India, and Syria had 
higher RSD values than Japan, which was included into the sample based on its higher salience 
and higher attention spike. Among these three countries, Syria had a relatively low salience value 
of 100 (third from the bottom of the top 25 most salient), while Iran and India had salience levels 
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(130 and 231 respectively) closer to the six countries already included in the sample. Based on 
their high RSD values and their higher salience, Iran and India were also included for analysis. 
The combination of three two criteria, salience, attention spikes, and the added variability 
measure produced a sample of 8 countries leaving out the United Kingdom and France, the two 
most salient in the group of 238 countries objects in The New York Times coverage. The two 
countries enjoyed noticeably higher levels of attention (950 and 737 average monthly references 
in The New York Times converge, compared to other 23 countries, on average mentioned 213 
times a month). They also seemed to have gone through longer, periods of increasing and 
decreasing salience. The high levels of salience for these countries, as well their tendency to 
attract increased media attention over the period, make them appropriate for testing another 
scenario of the dependence between news coverage and agendas of think tanks where a spike a 
substituted with a steady growth of attention. 
After measures were taken to increase the representativeness of the national news agenda 
by the data from the two elite newspapers, data on their attention to selected objects was 
aggregated into a single variable by means of addition. 
 
Time period and intervals 
As Abelson (1995) pointed out, “think tanks appear to make the greatest contribution to 
the development and refinement of ideas during presidential elections” (Competing in the 
Marketplace of Ideas section, para. 3) when advice from think tanks is in higher demand. It made 
sense to choose presidential elections as the mainstay for the time period, since the president has 
been traditionally considered the key figure in foreign policy (Hicks, 1996; Jody, 1983; Mangi, 
1994; Mulcahy, 1987). Searches for the 10 likely to be found in national news agenda objects in 
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The New York Times and The Washington Post coverage and think tank online content were 
conducted on a weekly basis and included 104 full weeks between Monday, January 3, 2011 and 
Sunday, December 30, 2012, time preceding, during and after the elections. 
In a preliminary analysis of data collected for object selection (from The Ney York Times 
coverage and corresponding months of think tank online content), some of the countries 
experienced spikes in attention in NYT, Brookings Institution, and Carnegie Endowment for 
International Piece during the same months. In order to detect the time lag between spikes of 
attention to a country in different sources, data had to be collected on weekly basis. 
A week was understood as a seven-day period, starting on Monday and ending on 
Sunday. Such parameters link the more extensive Sunday editions of The Washington Post and 
The New York Times (the latter is supplemented by The Week in Review, a summary section of 
proceeding coverage) with related coverage of the preceding week. 
Three measures – the period choice, choice of prominent (or elite) news outlets, and the 
selection of objects likely present on national news agenda – were meant to increase the 
likelihood of detecting a relationship between news agenda and the foci of think tanks. 
 
Variables and data analysis 
A variety of statistical tests have been employed by agenda-setting scholars. Researchers 
have used Pearson correlations (Golan, 2006; McCombs & Shaw, 1972), multiple regression 
analyses (Cook et al., 1983; Jacobs & Page, 2005; D. Weaver, 1991), Box-Tiao impact 
assessment techniques (Peake & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008), vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques 
(Edwards & Wood, 1999; Peake, 2001; Rutledge & Larsen Price, 2014; Tan & Weaver, 2007; 
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Wood & Peake, 1998), autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model (Soroka, 2003), and, in a 
recent McCombs’ piece, social network analysis (Vu, Guo, & McCombs, 2014). 
Some of the techniques deal with time series specifically in order to track the effects of 
past and concurrent values of independent variables onto dependent variables. The 
communication process is dynamic in nature, thus it is important to treat it as a process and track 
changes in indicators over time. Time series analyses are the best available statistical tools for 
such analysis (Yanovitzky & VanLear, 2008). Many conventional statistical methods 
traditionally used in mass communication research41 depend on the assumption that observations 
in analyzed datasets are independent. This ensures random the nature of errors (or normality of 
distribution). Sampling adjacent in time points introduces additional correlations (or 
autocorrelations) to the analysis, therefore restricting the use of these traditional statistical 
methods42 on time series data (Yanovitzky & VanLear, 2008). Besides accounting for 
autocorrelation, time series statistical models are appropriate for agenda-setting research due to 
their ability to (1) indicate temporal order between variables, (2) detect presence of lagged (not 
instantaneous) effects (Yanovitzky & VanLear, 2008). While able to estimate strength of 
correlations between variables as well as their temporal order,  time series modeling allows 
researchers to test both conditions of agenda-setting (correlation between agenda and emergence 
of objects on influencing agenda before influenced) simultaneously, while estimating the time it 
takes for agenda-setting effects to occur. 
                                                 
 
41 Such as Pearson Correlations in some of the above mentioned examples. 
42 Used in some of the examples of agenda-setting research mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
multiple regressions could produce biased results, if auto correlations (within variable, like often happens in time 
series) are present in the dataset. 
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Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), a classic time series analysis 
method, was used to prewhiten (remove autocorrelation from) both dependent and independent 
variables. The research employed the “equal footing” approach (Chatfield, 2004, p. 155) and 
fitted each times series to a first-order autoregressive ARIMA (1,0,0) model with no trend or 
moving average components. Residuals generated in the process of model fitting were used in a 
Pearson correlation and cross-correlation analyses in order to detect overall and lagged (delayed 
in time) correlations between news agenda and the content published online by think tanks. Both 
the prewhitening of the time series and correlation analyses were carried out in IBM SPSS 
Statistics 22 Software. 
Eliminating autocorrelations from all variables accounted for the foreign policy “issue 
inertia,” or determination of following attention from news media, president and Congress to an 
object by their previous attention to it (Edwards & Wood, 1999). This enabled concentration on 
relationships between variables not affected by their internal trends. 
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Chapter 5. 
Findings 
 
A total of 30 time series of search results for selected countries in news coverage and 
online content of the two selected think tanks, as well as correlations among the 30 times series, 
were analyzed. Three variables, (salience news coverage, attention in Brookings Institution’s 
content, and attention in Carnegie Endowment’s content) were created for each of the 10 likely 
to be found on national news agenda countries. For each country, indicators of object salience in 
The Washington Post and The New York Times coverage were aggregated (added) into a single 
news agenda variable. Attention to the objects in the Brookings Institution’s (BI) and Carnegie 
Foundation’s (CE) content were analyzed as separate variables. Each time series contained 104 
data points, one for every full week (starting Monday and ending Sunday, per explanation in 
Chapter 4) of 2011 and 2012. A data point represents the number of results in a search for the 
particular country in online content of a think tank over a seven-day period or the sum of search 
results in The Washington Post and The New York Times over the same seven-day period. 
The 30 time series were first prewhitened by means of fitting them to ARIMA (1,0,0) 
models and generating new variables from residual values (difference between the original and 
predicted by ARIMA model values). ARIMA, like other time series forecasting tools, generates 
values for a variable based on its intrinsic regularities, or autocorrelation. Elimination of such 
intrinsic rigidities is crucial for comparing time series to one another (Yanovitzky & VanLear, 
2008). If not accounted for, autocorrelations affect between-series comparisons. Table 2 shows 
the difference in Pearson’s correlation values between original and prewhitened time series. 
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Table 2. Pearson’s correlations among prewhitened and original time series. 
Country 
News and Brookings 
correlation 
News and Carnegie 
correlation 
Prewhitened 
times series 
Original 
data 
Prewhitened 
times series 
Original 
data 
United 
Kingdom     
France  0.324   
Japan  0.211 0.415 0.454 
India     
Egypt 0.438 0.67 0.535 0.712 
Iran 0.478 0.516  0.213 
Turkey   -0.243  
Libya 0.685 0.736 0.321 0.448 
Pakistan 0.594 0.62 0.396 0.436 
Greece 0.478 0.642 0.227 0.436 
* Only correlations significant at 0.05 level and higher were reported 
in the table. Both variables in correlating pairs were either 
prewhitened or remained unchanged. 
 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, correlations between time series generally appear stronger when 
prewhitening is not introduced. Not-prewhitened data also shows correlations between the 
amount of attention to France and Japan in Brookings Institution’s content and salience levels for 
these countries in news coverage as well as Iran’s salience in news coverage and attention to it 
from the Carnegie Endowment. In these three cases, prewhitened data displayed no statistically 
significant connections. Both the stronger correlations and the presence of connections 
exclusively in not-prewhitened data are caused by autocorrelations. The example of Egypt in 
figures 1-3 below illustrates the strength of autocorrelation in news coverage, Brookings 
Institution’s online content and Carnegie Endowment’s online content.  
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Figure 1. Autocorrelation in original time series of Egypt's salience in news coverage. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Autocorrelation in original time series of Egypt's salience in Brookings Institution's 
online content. 
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Figure 3. Autocorrelation in original time series of Egypt's salience in Carnegie Endowment's 
online content. 
 
 
Autocorrelation of data two weeks back was present in all three variables for Egypt, 
accounting for 0.232 and 0.177 of difference in r values for Pearson’s correlations between news 
and BI, news and CE respectively. Weaker autocorrelation levels in Pakistan variables (r=0.356 
at lag 1 for news coverage and r=0.212 at lag 5 for CE) caused smaller increases in r values, 
0.026 and 0.04, for Pearson’s correlations between news and BI, news and CE respectively. 
While presence and strength of autocorrelations differed among the 30 time-series, variables 
showing higher levels of autocorrelation also displayed stronger between-variable correlations 
among original time series43. Prewhitening was meant to eliminate the autocorrelation effects 
and avoid cross-correlation bias (or overinflation of connections) among the variables of this 
                                                 
 
43 Remaining autocorrelations are summarized in Appendix D. 
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study. While multiple aproaches to prewhitening are employed in social sciences (Yanovitzky & 
VanLear, 2008), all time series were treated equally for the following cross-correlation analyses, 
as hypothesized agenda-setting effects between news coverage and think tank online content 
were expected to go both directions, from news media to think tanks and vice versa. 
Examination of cross-correlation analyses revealed a variety of relationships among 
prewhitened variables, showing that attention from individual think tanks to 7 out of 10 countries 
correlates with the salience of these countries on news agenda to some degree. 
Results below are presented in the order of corresponding hypotheses. 
 
H1. The first hypothesis, stating that salience of selected countries in news coverage 
positively correlates with attention to these countries in the content published by thinks tanks on 
their websites, was partially supported by the data. Salience of five countries, Egypt, Iran, Libya, 
Pakistan, and Greece, in news coverage correlated with the amount of attention to these countries 
in the Brookings Institute’s output. Six countries, Japan, Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Pakistan, and 
Greece, enjoyed correlating amounts of attention in news coverage and in Carnegie Endowment 
content. All statistically significant correlations are highlighted in Table 3. 
Countries in Table 3 are sorted according to their salience represented by the combined 
number of mentions found in The New York Times and The Washington Post over 104 weeks of 
the research period. R-values and p-values for Pearson correlations are presented in separate 
columns. N=104 for all variables. 
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Table 3. Salience of countries in news media and Pearson’s correlations between their salience 
and attention to them in Brookings Institution’s and Carnegie Endowment’s online content. 
Country Salience 
News and Brookings 
correlation 
News and Carnegie 
correlation 
r p r p 
United 
Kingdom 43973 0.066 0.505 0.073 0.461 
France 28729 0.153 0.122 0.007 0.943 
Japan 12805 0.181 0.067 0.415 <0.001 
India 11201 0.084 0.397 -0.38 0.704 
Egypt 9916 0.438 <0.001 0.535 <0.001 
Iran 9320 0.478 <0.001 0.08 0.417 
Turkey 7524 0.016 0.87 -0.243 0.013 
Libya 7209 0.685 <0.001 0.321 0.001 
Pakistan 6879 0.594 <0.001 0.396 <0.001 
Greece 6331 0.478 <0.001 0.227 0.021 
 
 
While Pearson’s correlations presented in the table above are not necessarily indicative of 
a causal relationship between object salience in news coverage and attention to these objects 
from think tanks, the presence of strong correlations for some of the countries illustrates a 
connection between media and think tank attention. This satisfies the first condition of agenda-
setting effects for some of the cases, requiring a significant level of relation between the cause 
(agenda-setter’s attention to objects) and effect (change in affected agenda).  
Cross-correlations between time series are indicative of lags (or time difference) in 
correlations – they provide information to satisfy (or reject) the second condition of agenda-
setting effects, the cause must precede the effect. In cross-correlation analyses, carried out 
between pairs of time series, one time series is considered as leading the other if a statistically 
significant relationships between its lags (proceeding values) and following values in the second 
one are found (Yanovitzky & VanLear, 2008). Determining the leading time series is crucial for 
62 
 
the remaining two hypotheses of this research. Another potentially beneficial characteristic of 
this data analysis method lies in its ability to detect more correlations than a simple Pearson’s 
test could do. Cross-correlation analysis compares both concurrent (like Pearson’s correlation 
with non-lagged variables does) and lagged (or differing in time) values of time series. 
Essentially, the procedure creates multiple versions of the two time series it compares (lagged by 
zero to a virtually infinite number of time points) and administers parwise comparisons between 
the lagged version of one variable and fixed values of the other. As a result, multiple connections 
could be detected between two time series, thus informing our conclusions about the ability of 
the data to satisfy the first condition of agenda-setting. 
India’s salience in news coverage correlated with BI’s content at lag 1 (r=0.271), 
suggesting a possibility for media effects in this case. While the Pearson’s correlation tests did 
not reveal covariations between the country’s news coverage and content about it published by 
think tanks on their websites, the relationship between the news coverage and Brookings 
Institution’s content was present. United Kingdom and France, the two most salient in news 
coverage countries, just as they showed no correlation for concurrent news coverage and think 
tank content in Pearson’s correlation tests, displayed no significant lagged relationships in cross-
correlation analyses. The other seven countries, while exhibiting some level of covariation in the 
Pearson’s correlation test, displayed some level of lagged correlation between news coverage 
and the content published by think tanks on their websites, while also showing correlation in 
concurrent attention from think tanks and salience in the news. Table 4 presents the number of 
significant correlations, including those at lag 0, between news coverage, BI’s online content and 
CE’s online content. Statistically significant cross-correlations are discussed in more detail in the 
following subsections as valuable in determining the direction of possible agenda-setting effects. 
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Table 4. Number of correlations at time lags 0- 7 between news coverage and content published 
by think tanks on their websites. 
Country 
Number of significant correlations 
 
News and 
Brookings 
Institution 
News and 
Carnegie 
Endowment 
United 
Kingdom 0 0 
France 0 0 
Japan 0 2 
India 1 0 
Egypt 2 3 
Iran 5 1 
Turkey 2 2 
Libya 2 3 
Pakistan 1 2 
Greece 2 2 
 
 
For seven out of 10 countries, there is at least one statistically significant correlation 
between their salience in news coverage and attention to them in Brookings Institution’s online 
content. Similarly, though with a different set of correlating countries, in seven out of 10 cases, 
there is a statistically significant correlation between news coverage and Carnegie Endowment’s 
content. In summary, in 14 out of 20 possible pairs of potentially related times series (or in 70% 
of cases), at least one statistically significant correlation was observed, which partially supports 
the first hypothesis. 
The fact that salience in the news and attention from think tanks did not correlate for all 
the cases suggests a situational nature of the possible agenda-setting effects between news media 
and think tanks. Depending on the direction of agenda-setting effects (from news media to think 
tanks or vice versa), the conditions enabling and determining the strength of agenda-setting may 
vary greatly, as think tanks and news media are driven by different goals and principles of 
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functioning. As suggested in the discussion, the nature of the events associated with increased 
attention to a country may serve as such a contributing factor, but other, less obvious 
explanations need to be considered and investigated. 
It appears some of the factors determining the likelihood of a think tank basing its 
attention to a country on the salience of this country in the news could be universal for more than 
one case and organization while individual for particular organization causes might be at play. 
Among the ten countries in Table 4, salience of India only correlated with attention to the 
country from Brookings Institution’s content, while only Carnegie Endowment’s attention to 
Japan related to its news coverage, suggesting the presence of individual for think tanks 
determinants of attention.  
The first hypothesis thus did not receive full support, which could mean that mechanisms 
other than the factors used for object selection (salience, attention spikes and possible multiple 
spikes) could be at play in determining the likelihood of object salience in news coverage 
propagating attention to from think tanks. 
 
H2. Though preceding news coverage did affect the attention think tanks gave to some 
countries, the relative salience of these countries did not appear to be related to the direction of 
agenda-setting effects. 
Not only was there no clear indication of the direction of agenda-setting effects after the 
autocorrelation effects were accounted for, there was no indication of any relationship between 
the attention to the more salient countries in news coverage and content published by think tanks 
online. 
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As seen in Table 3 of bivariate Pearson’s correlations, of the four most salient in news 
coverage countries, UK, France, Japan, and India, only Japan’s salience in news coverage 
correlated at a statistically significant level with the attention given to the country only from the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Both Brookings and Carnegie published 
comparable numbers of entries about Japan on their websites over the analyzed weeks of 2011 
and 2012, 379 and 443 respectively. In both cases, the numbers were close to average among 10 
analyzed countries (388 for BI and 415.2 for CE). According to their websites, both think tanks 
have experts specializing in East Asia and Japan. Additional data and analysis are necessary to 
explain why Carnegie’s attention to the country appeared to follow Japan’s salience in news 
coverage and Brookings did not. An institution’s structural organization and level of 
centralization, as well as style of work of individual research fellows, may determine the 
publication schedule. These questions need to be addressed in future research in interviews with 
research fellows and administration. 
As revealed by cross-correlation analysis, India’s salience in news coverage correlated 
with the Brookings Institution’s attention to the country at lag 1 (r=0.271), while displaying no 
connection with the Carnegie Endowment’s online content. Unlike in the case of Japan, amounts 
of attention to India from Brookings and Carnegie differed (443 mentions or 14% more than 
average, and 323 mentions, or 22% less than average, respectively).While statistical analysis of 
the connection between overall attention to a country from think tanks and the likelihood of 
agenda-setting effects would not be relevant to the ten cases used in this study, such a factor 
would be worth investigating in follow-up research. 
In his study of the ability of U.S. presidents to affect the agendas of the media and 
Congress, Peake (2001) found that news media led the foreign policy agenda on more salient 
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issues, but presidents were able to affect the attention of the Congress and of the media to less 
salient ones. It appears that salience of an object in news coverage may not be a deciding factor 
in its ability to propagate attention of think tanks. Hypothesis 2 of this study therefore is rejected 
as no evidence is found suggesting that news media are more likely to lead the attention think 
tanks pay to more salient in news coverage countries. 
McCombs (2004, p. 117) suggested that, while multiple sources are shown to affect news 
media attention, including among other sources, national leaders, public relations professionals 
and public information officers, “all of these influence steams are filtered through the ground 
rules established by the norms of journalism, and they are very powerful filters.” Between the 
intrinsic filters and inter-media agenda-setting effects (where more prominent news sources 
usually greatly affect the agenda of less prominent ones) a great deal of extraneous influences 
gets filtered out from the news agenda. Similarly, intrinsic for think tanks norms may be 
contributing to the likelihood of various topics to penetrate their agenda. As examples of India 
and Japan in content from BI’s ad CE’s websites suggest, these norms could vary from 
organizations to organization. Further investigation into the existence of such norms and their 
potential ‘filtering ability’ in agenda-setting processes could be carried out through a 
combination of interviewing and content-analysis techniques. 
Unlike the other three countries of higher news salience, Japan had a higher value of the 
attention spike indicator, while India was included based on relatively high salience and relative 
standard deviation, indicative of multiple (possibly smaller) attention spikes. It appears that 
intermedia agenda-setting catalysts, a combination of higher salience and attention spikes 
(Atkinson et al., 2014) may not be as reliable a predictor of object salience transfer between 
news media and think tanks either. 
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H3. It was hypothesized that for less salient countries covered in news reports, changes in 
attention to them in think tank content would precede changes in their salience in the news 
agenda. While the four less salient among the selected countries, Turkey, Libya, Pakistan, and 
Greece, enjoyed correlating amounts of attention in the content published by think tanks online 
and in news coverage, temporal order in between the two could be determined in cross-
correlation analyses.  
In each, news content time series was entered first. Statistically significant correlations in 
positive lags on charts below and tables found in Appendix C they are indicative of relationships 
between the proceeding news and following think tank content. Correlations in negative lags 
indicate the leading role of think tank content time series. Each lag represents one week 
difference between time series. Two cross correlations were generated for each country, one for 
each of the two analyzed think tanks, using the residual values of the ARIMA (1,0,0) model of 
their content and the residuals of modeled in the same way news coverage time series. 
Starting with Greece, the least salient of the 10 selected countries, the first cross-
correlation charts, Figure 4 and Figure 5, shows the opposite of the hypothesized relationship 
between salience of the country in news coverage and the attention it received in Brookings 
Institution’s and Carnegie Endowment’s online content. In both cases, news coverage time series 
appears to lead the think tank content time series. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, statistically significant correlations between news coverage and 
BI content on Greece were found at positive lag 5 and in the unity time (lag 0), indicating a 
certain degree of co-variation between the two time series and suggesting a possibility, delayed 
by six weeks, effects of media salience on BI’s attention to the country. Multiple reasons could 
account for such a delay and would need further investigation. A certain level of topic saturation 
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may need to be reached among research fellows or administration for them to take interest in 
such a topic, enough to start active research on the topic. Lower levels of familiarity with the 
topic among experts may delay their reaction while required research and review of information 
is carried out. Unavailability of a particular expert due to travel, workload elsewhere or other 
reasons could factor in as well and need to be investigated. Of course, a study examining 
statistically significant samples of correlations with different lags will need to be conducted.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Brookings Institution 
ARIMA residuals for Greece. 
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Similarly, as Figure 5 shows, news coverage of Greece correlates with the CE’s attention 
to the country at unity time and at lag 1, with the lagged relationship appearing stronger than the 
correlation between same-week data points. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Carnegie Endowment 
ARIMA residuals for Greece 
 
 
While a strong (r=0.594) correlation was found between news coverage and BI content 
on Pakistan (Figure 6), cross-correlation analysis indicates changes in BI’s attention to the 
country and its salience in news coverage were happening during the same weeks, suggesting the 
presence of covariation in two time series. Two potential explanations of such a phenomenon 
will require additional analysis. First, both Pakistan’s salience in the news and attention to the 
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country from Brookings Institution could be simultaneously affected by extraneous factors, such 
as the agenda of policymakers, and major developments in the situation attracting attention of 
both the think tank and news media. News media could serve as a source of information about 
such factors for think tanks and thus still be a part of their foci formation. Another possible 
scenario is increased speed of reaction from think tanks, where the delay between increased news 
salience of an object and think tanks publishing more content about it is much shorter than a 
week.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Brookings Institution 
ARIMA residuals for Pakistan. 
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The anticipated in Hypothesis 3 relationship between preceding think tank attention to an 
object and the following change of its salience in news coverage was detected on the example of 
Pakistan in CE’s content and the New York Times / Washington Post coverage. Correlation at 
lag -5 and at lag 0 in Figure 7 show that increases in attention to Pakistan in Carnegie 
Endowment’s content proceeded spikes in its salience in news coverage by five weeks and 
coincided with those spikes.  As a go to source for news media on political expertise on 
international issues (Abelson, 2009), think tanks could potentially lead the news agenda. The 
case of Pakistan and the Carnegie Endowment may illustrate just such a relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Carnegie Endowment 
ARIMA residuals for Pakistan. 
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Salience of Libya in news coverage covariated strongly (r=0.685) with BI’s attention to 
the country with the only significant correlation found at lag 0, and has preceded CE’s attention 
by one week (r=0.225 at lag 1, r=0.321 at lag 0). 
The case of Turkey, the fourth from the bottom of the “more salient” countries list, 
produced weaker (compared to other connections reviewed in this chapter) correlations at lag -7 
(r=0.232) and lag 2 (r=0.219) in the cross-correlation between news coverage and BI’s content, 
which did not illustrate a clear relationship between the two time series. There appeared to be a 
negative association for concurrent news coverage and CE content (r=-243 at lag 0), suggesting a 
possibility contrary to the agenda-setting relationship, where increased salience in news coverage 
(or factors causing the increase) could discourage a think tank from publishing as much content 
about the object as it has. The latter case revealed unanticipated direction on possible agenda-
setting relationship between news media and think tanks. 
While suggesting the possibility of think tank attention affecting salience of objects in 
news coverage (in case of CE and Pakistan), providing more illustration for possible media 
effects on think tanks (Greece in case of both think tanks, Libya in CE’s online content), 
suggesting more complex cyclical relationships (remote mutual effects between news coverage 
of Turkey and BI’s attention to it, negative relationship between Turkey’s news coverage and 
CE’s attention) data do not provide much support for Hypothesis 3. It does not appear that 
attention to less salient objects in news coverage is more likely to be affected by attention to 
these objects from think tanks. 
Of the remaining countries (neither the four top salient nor the four least salient among 
the ten selected), Iran showed only one significant correlation (r=0.224) at lag 4 between news 
coverage and CE’s content and revealed an interesting cyclical relationship between news and 
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BI’s attention to the object. In Figure 8, significant positive correlations are found at lag -2 
(r=0.239), lag 0 (r=0.478), lag 2 (r=0.377), and lag 6 (r=0.253), as well as weaker negative 
relationship at lag -1 (r=-0.214). While the relationships between preceding news coverage of 
Iran and following BI’s attention to the country is stronger than the opposite, there appears to be 
reciprocity in the exchange of agendas here. Additionally, another instance of a negative 
correlation in this example is different from that in the case of Turkey and CE. Here we see 
preceding think tank content negatively correlating with new media coverage, suggesting that the 
previously observed case of negative correlation might be a part of a cyclical reciprocal 
relationship.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Brookings Institution 
ARIMA residuals for Iran. 
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Represented in Figure 9, the case of Egypt provided more robust than other instances 
support for the possible media effects on think tanks attention. For BI’s content, correlations with 
news coverage were found at lag 0 (r=0.438) and lag 1 (r=0.303). The relationship between CE 
and the news media (Figure 9) showed a gradually weakening temporal relationship with 
significant correlations found at lag 0 (0.535), lag 1 (r=0.445), and lag 2 (r=0.241). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Cross-correlation between news coverage ARIMA residuals and Carnegie Endowment 
ARIMA residuals for Egypt. 
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Chapter 6. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
U.S. foreign policy affects not only the lives of American citizens, but the development 
and promotion of democracy in foreign nations (Finkel et al., 2007). A number of forces (Baum 
& Potter, 2008; Peake, 2001; Peake & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008; Rutledge & Larsen Price, 2014; 
Tan & Weaver, 2007) have been shown to take part in shaping the agenda of this policy. These 
include the agendas of news media, policymakers (Wood & Peake, 1998), and the public 
(Soroka, 2003). No role in this process of foreign policy agenda-setting has been allocated yet 
for foreign policy think tanks. Dubbed the “powerhouses” of American politics (Wiarda, 2008, p. 
117), think tanks are growing in influence and significance (Abelson, 1996; Dickson, 1971; 
McGann, 2005; Sanders, 2009; Weidenbaum, 2009) and could be affecting U.S. foreign policy 
agenda. If so, they deserve a place in agenda-setting models. On the other hand, while relying 
heavily on news media in their work, U.S. foreign policy think tanks have not yet been shown to 
be affected (like other influential in foreign policy groups) by news media content. 
This dissertation probes the possibility that news media do affect the agendas of foreign 
policy think tanks. This work is meant to fulfil two main goals, (1) better our understanding of 
the role think tanks play in foreign policy by means of exploring agenda-setting as a possible 
mechanism the impact think tanks have on foreign policy, and (2) advance the knowledge of 
news media agenda-setting effects in foreign policy by identifying another possible channel of 
media impacts foreign policy think tanks. 
While employing the agenda-setting theory, this dissertation looked at objects 
(represented by foreign countries) in news coverage from leading U.S. newspapers, The New 
York Times and The Washington Post, and attention to these countries in the corresponding 
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period (104 full weeks of 2011 and 2012) in the content published on the websites of the top U.S. 
foreign policy think tanks, Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
As an exploratory study, this work concentrated on searching for illustrations for possible 
relationships between think tanks and news media that would need to be tested in future research. 
Accordingly, measures were taken to heighten the likelihood of detecting hypothesized 
relationships.  
In order to increase the chances of detecting relationships between the attention to 
countries from think tanks and their salience in news coverage, the period for analyses was 
chosen to include presidential election. During elections greater attention is paid to policy think 
tanks, including those dealing with foreign policy (Abelson, 1995). Countries with more salience 
in news coverage were chosen for analysis to ensure that measures on the two newspapers were 
more likely to be representative of the national news agenda. Appearing in more news outlets, 
the objects would have more chances to be noticed and possibly adopted as foci of their attention 
by think tanks. Think tanks are said to adjust their foci to agendas of policymakers (Wiarda, 
2008). They could, similarly, be inclined to synchronize their agenda with that of influential in 
foreign policy news media. 
The first of the three hypotheses of this research, arguing that correlations between 
objects’ salience in news and attention to them from think tanks, was partially supported by the 
data. Results of Pearson’s correlations and cross-correlation analyses showed connections 
between both concurrent and lagged contents. Pre-whitening of the variables using ARIMA 
techniques helped to avoid overinflating the correlations by eliminating autocorrelations within 
time series. 
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While showing strong correlations between the attention think tanks paid in their online 
content to some countries and the salience of these countries in the news, the data did not provide 
much support for the hypothesis about issues salience determining the direction of agenda-setting 
effects between news media and think tanks. The finding suggests that theagenda-setting 
direction determination may be more nuanced in the case of think tanks than it is in the 
relationship between news media and presidents (Peake, 2001). While news media may follow 
closely the marriage of Prince William44, Duke of Cambridge, think tanks, due to their main 
interest in advancing the “cause of peace” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.-a), 
strengthening American Democracy and securing a “more open, safe, prosperous and 
cooperative international system” (Brookings Institution, n.d.-a) may be less inclined to devote 
their limited resources to the investigation of the possible impact of Kate Middleton’s wedding 
gown on international politics.   They could be especially selective in their attention to mostly 
entertaining content while at the same time, the civil war in Libya demands immediate attention 
(and thus, need for expertise) from United Nations and the U.S. Data show that the connection 
between news coverage and content on websites of leading foreign policy think tanks is strong. 
At the same time, it draws the line between the two institutions. Mechanisms applicable to 
intermedia agenda-setting may not work in this case. 
Recent research showed that highly salient objects with spikes of attention were very 
likely to exhibit similar attention patterns across the news media (Atkinson et al., 2014). In other 
words, an object’s ability to enter and shape the national news agenda could be predicted by only   
                                                 
 
44 For Example, The New York Times mentioned prince’s spouse, Kate Middleton, Duchess of Cambridge, 
in 284 news articles and 135 blog entries (total of 419), and The Washington Post did so in 297 newspaper articles, 
197 web-based stories and four blog entries (total of 497) over the analyzed period. 
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its salience and attention spike in coverage from few or one organizations. Both salience and 
spike measures are exclusively related to the number of times these objects are mentioned by a 
news outlet over time. Based on these findings, one could assume that if The New York Times, or 
another prominent national news outlet, periodically devotes a great deal of attention to an 
object, it is sure to appear as part of the national news agenda as well. Such a rule did not hold 
true for the propagation countries in the research and advocacy agendas of think tanks in our 
research. This finding illustrates that think tanks and news media are governed by different 
principles in their attention, which overlap in some cases but do not in others. These overlapping 
points may be of special interests for media effects researchers and scholars investigating the 
impact of think tanks, as the two organizations could possibly amplify (or undermine) each 
other’s input into the U.S. foreign policy processes. One could begin the investigation with an 
analysis of the types of events and countries traditionally enjoying higher levels of attention from 
think tanks and try to look for patterns in news coverage of these objects. 
The countries with more salience in the news did not appear to be more likely to 
propagate attention of think tanks; whereas attention from think tanks to less salient in the news 
issues did not seem to reliably lead news agenda either. While these results are preliminary and 
bigger samples are necessary to test the significance of different factors45 determining presence 
and direction of agenda-setting effects between news media and U.S. foreign policy think tanks, 
data analysis produced several notable observations. The latter could be used in future research 
design, as they shed light on possible influential factors and uncover different types of 
                                                 
 
45 Such as the nature of events causing interest to a country from news media and think tanks, think tanks 
policies and plans, and even demographics of their teams of fellows, which could include foreign non-resident 
contributors led by different sources of news and information than their U.S.-based counterparts. 
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relationships between the amounts of attention think tanks pay to objects and the salience of 
these objects in news coverage.  
The relationship between the news media coverage and the research and advocacy 
agendas of think tanks was strong in some cases and appeared situational and nuanced, as the 
direction of the agenda-setting effects would vary between cases. 
(1) The news media were able to influence the agendas of think tanks more in some cases 
and not at all in others, and vice versa. The nature of events causing spikes of attention from the 
news media and from the think tanks, as opposed to the sheer volume and strength of spikes in 
news media attention could be playing an important role in determining whether media could 
lead foci of attention in content published online by think tanks. Given their specialized interest 
in foreign policy issues, think tanks seem largely to ignore natural disasters and other events 
closely followed by the news media. In this research, spikes of attention to Egypt, Libya, 
Pakistan, and Greece in both the news coverage and the content published by think tanks online 
coincided with pivotal events in these countries’ socio-political development46 , accompanied by 
the United States’ involvement, or potentially causing outcomes that could affect U.S. interests. 
While spikes in the news salience of Japan and Turkey were concurrent with natural disasters 
devastating these countries in March 2011 and November 2011 respectively, the attention to 
them did not increase in BI’s output while additional news coverage for these countries may 
have triggered a reaction from CE. While the nature of events appears to play a significant role in 
determining the ability of news media coverage to affect foci of attention of think tanks, 
additional factors, very likely intrinsic to individual think tanks, are important in enabling media 
                                                 
 
46 Such as the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Libyan Civil War of 2011, death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, 
deep economic crisis in Greece threatening stability of Europe. 
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effects. The fact that both natural disaster-triggered news salience spikes found reflection in CE’s 
online content could be indicative of an organizational focus and perhaps pre-existing interest to 
catastrophes and other crises of not entirely political nature. A detailed investigation into the 
organization’s issue foci over time as well as interviews with the think tank’s administration and 
research fellows may shed more light on this question. 
(2) The news media agenda and the agendas of think tanks were reciprocal in some cases, 
while the direction of possible influence was clearer in others. Cross-correlation analyses 
revealed (a) significant correlations in both directions for Iran and Turkey in news coverage and 
BI’s online content. It showed (b) news media leading the attention of both think tanks in cases 
of Egypt, Libya and Greece, or (c) the attention of one of the two think tanks (Japan and Turkey 
in CE’s content and India in BI's). And (d) think tanks led the salience of Pakistan (led by CE).  
In most of the cases where a positive relationship was detected between news coverage and 
content from think tanks, lagged and concurrent news coverage correlated with attention from 
think tanks, suggesting that news media took the lead in bringing these countries within the 
agendas of the analyzed think tanks. However, as the case of Pakistan in CE’s content illustrates, 
sometimes think tank agendas anticipated (and by far) the attention to country received from the 
news media. In other cases, it is difficult to say, who starts paying attention to a particular 
country first, as only concurrent salience and attention from think tanks correlated (like in the 
example of Libya and Brookings Institution), or the influence between news coverage and the 
content published by think tanks on their websites appeared to be directed both ways (Iran and 
BI). 
(3) In some cases, one of the two think tanks would correlate with news media in its 
attention to a country and the other one wouldn’t. This suggests that exclusive factors for a think 
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tank could be determining their susceptibility to agenda-setting effects. CE followed the trend in 
increased coverage of Japan, while BI did not. Similarly, while news media and BI’s attention to 
Iran correlated strongly, no connection was found between Iran’s salience in news coverage and 
the amount of published online content about the country produced by CE. 
While it is difficult to conclude with certainty that agenda-setting effects exist between 
news media and U.S. foreign policy think tanks, the data in some cases show correlation and 
temporal relationship, the necessary conditions of agenda-setting. These relationships, and 
factors contributing to them should be explored in more detail in future research. Interviews with 
research fellows and the administration of think tanks may shed light on factors enabling and 
determining the direction of agenda-setting effects between news media and think tanks. The 
strength of these factors could be tested in future research. 
 
Future research 
Conducting another set of content analyses, while controlling for nature of “spiking” 
events and including a greater number of objects (enough for statistically significant results) is 
imperative for a better understanding of factors determining the direction and strength of the 
exchange between media and think tank agendas. The nature of events, causing increased 
attention in both institutions, could be one explanation of the situational nature of agenda-setting 
effects and other factors. These might include the composition of research teams in various think 
tanks, their goals, research and editorial policies. Studying the funding sources, the history of 
attention to various types of issues from think tanks and other factors interviewing research 
fellows and administrations of think tank may reveal. 
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Before the next set of content analyses or experimental studies, exploratory interviews 
and surveys need to be conducted in order to gain a better insight into possible factors affecting 
the presence and strength of agenda-setting effects in foreign policy research and advocacy. 
Some of the questions may directly ask research fellows and administration about their decision-
making and prioritization of the topics, about sources of information they use for their work and 
outside work-related activities. Deeper, long-form interviewing techniques may many factors to 
be tested in the future. 
As the sweep and importance of social media are growing, it is important to look into 
their potential role in foreign policy agenda-setting. Thus, interviews among research fellows and 
the administration of think tanks should ask questions about preferred and more utilized sources 
of news and relevant to work information. If social media and/or other sources are identified as 
valuable for think tanks, their content should be included in further studies. 
Other elements of the foreign agenda-setting processes (policymakers and the public) and 
their agendas need to be considered as factors as well. Effects of think tanks foci on agendas of 
policymakers need to be tested in order to substantiate the possible role of think tanks as 
channels of (or amplifiers) of news media effects on foreign policy agenda. 
As an exploratory study, this research produced results of limited generalizability. 
Accordingly, some of its limitations need to be addressed in future studies on the topic. This 
dissertation deliberately selected organizations and cases more likely to display relationships 
between news coverage and online content of think tanks in order to explore the nature of such 
relationships. Drawing a representative sample of organizations is necessary for future research. 
It is important to consider objects of wider news salience spectrum in order to test the role of the 
news salience factor in enabling agenda-setting effects. 
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A possible explanation for some of the relationships between think tanks and news media 
only existing during unity time (lag 0 in cross-correlations in case of Pakistan and Brookings 
Institution) might be rooted in the weekly basis of the time series analyzed in this research. 
Sampling data on a daily basis may produce more detailed pictures of think tanks and news 
media relationship. 
Since content analysis is not necessarily the best method for a test of causal relationships, 
a natural experiment could provide more definitive proof of agenda-setting effects in foreign 
policy research and advocacy. 
This dissertation contributed to our knowledge and understanding of agenda-setting 
effects by identifying more possible channels of media effects in foreign policy (indirectly, via 
effects on think tanks, an arguably influential institution). It illustrated that the news agenda 
could be set by an expert organization’s foci or engage in more complicated, reciprocal agenda-
setting exchanges with such organizations. While more research is needed to make more 
generalizable conclusions and to evaluate the impact of various factors in foreign policy agenda-
setting, this dissertation provides a basis for further exploration and for inclusion of think tanks 
into the foreign policy agenda-setting research.  
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Appendix A.  Object agenda-setting search terms
Reg
ion 
Serch 
Term 
20
11 hits 
A
fr
ic
a
 
E
a
st
er
n
 A
fr
ic
a
 
Burundi 38 
Comoros 8 
Djibouti 32 
Eritrea 46 
Ethiopia 
30
5 
Kenya 
55
1 
Madagas
car 92 
Malawi 48 
Mauritiu
s 34 
Mayotte 1 
Mozamb
ique 61 
Réunion 
island 0 
Rwanda 
17
4 
Seychell
es 21 
Somalia 
43
3 
"South 
Sudan" 
10
4 
Uganda 
25
5 
Tanzania 
14
0 
Zambia 73 
Zimbab
we 
19
8 
  
M
id
d
le
 A
fr
ic
a
 
Angola 74 
Cameroo
n 80 
"Central 
African 
Republic" 13 
Chad 
70
4 
Congo 
27
6 
"Equator
ial Guinea" 41 
Gabon 33 
Sao 
Tome and 
Principe 1 
  
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 A
fr
ic
a
 
Algeria 
23
0 
Egypt or 
Cairo or Tahrir 
or Mubarak or 
Omar Suleiman 
26
95 
Libya 
21
13 
Morocco 
34
1 
Sudan 
40
1 
Tunisia 
88
7 
"Wester
n Sahara" 14 
  
S
o
u
th
er
n
 
A
fr
ic
a
 
Botswan
a 58 
Lesotho 8 
Namibia 45 
South 
Africa 
88
5 
Swazilan
d 18 
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es
te
rn
 A
fr
ic
a
 
Benin 47 
Burkina 
Faso 58 
Cabo 
Verde or Cape 
Verde 13 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
14
5 
Gambia 25 
Ghana 
16
2 
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Guinea 
AND NOT 
"Guinea-Bissau" 
AND NOT 
"French Guiana" 
AND NOT 
"Papua New 
Guinea" AND 
NOT "Equatorial 
Guinea" 
19
8 
"Guinea-
Bissau" 12 
Liberia 
11
4 
Mali 
10
9 
Mauritan
ia 44 
Niger 
13
3 
Nigeria 
33
6 
Saint 
Helena 2 
Senegal 
12
7 
Sierra 
Leone 83 
Togo 23 
  
A
m
e
ri
ca
s 
C
a
ri
b
b
ea
n
 
Anguilla 11 
Antigua 
and Barbuda 19 
Aruba 29 
Bahamas 
11
4 
Barbado
s 36 
Bonaire, 
Sint Eustatius 
and Saba or 
Caribbean 
Netherlands 0 
British 
Virgin Islands 19 
Cayman 
Islands 57 
Cuba 
70
2 
Curaçao 22 
Dominic
a 17 
"Domini
can Republic" 
21
3 
Grenada 28 
Guadelo
upe 35 
Haiti 
42
5 
Jamaica 
48
7 
Martiniq
ue 21 
Montserr
at 18 
Puerto 
Rico 
29
4 
Saint-
Barthélemy 2 
Saint 
Kitts and Nevis 16 
Saint 
Lucia 2 
Saint 
Martin 30 
Saint 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines 10 
Sint 
Maarten 1 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 81 
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and Caicos 
Islands 13 
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a
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e
ri
ca
 
Belize 31 
Costa 
Rica 
18
8 
El 
Salvador 
12
1 
Guatema
la 
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8 
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3 
Mexico 
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94 
 
Nicaragu
a 90 
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29
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u
th
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m
er
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a
 
Argentin
a 
61
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Bolivia 
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7 
Brazil 
14
62 
Chile 
53
9 
Colombi
a 
44
9 
Ecuador 
18
5 
Falkland 
Islands or 
Malvinas 11 
"French 
Guiana" 10 
Guyana 52 
Paragua
y 88 
Peru 
26
3 
Surinam
e 36 
Uruguay 
13
8 
Venezue
la 
33
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N
o
rt
h
er
n
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m
er
ic
a
 
Bermuda 
13
8 
Canada 
33
79 
Greenlan
d 94 
Saint 
Pierre and 
Miquelon 2 
  
A
si
a
 
C
en
tr
a
l 
A
si
a
 
    
Kazakhs
tan 
13
3 
Kyrgyzst
an 39 
Tajikista
n 49 
Turkmen
istan 29 
Uzbekist
an 81 
  
E
a
st
er
n
 A
si
a
 
China 
55
10 
Hong 
Kong 
10
37 
Macao 36 
North 
Korea 
43
4 
Japan or 
Tokyo or Naoto 
Kan 
37
64 
Mongoli
a 94 
South 
Korea  
79
3 
  
S
o
u
th
er
n
 A
si
a
 
Afghanis
tan 
27
61 
Banglad
esh 
19
2 
Bhutan 39 
India 
27
69 
Iran 
15
27 
Maldive
s 40 
Nepal 
12
8 
Pakistan 
15
34 
Sri 
Lanka 
12
7 
  
S
o
u
th
-E
a
st
er
n
 
A
si
a
 
Brunei 
Darussalam 11 
Cambodi
a 
21
0 
Indonesi
a 
47
0 
Lao 
People's 38 
95 
 
Democratic 
Republic 
Malaysia 
23
2 
Myanma
r or Burma  
23
7 
Philippin
es 
37
7 
Singapor
e 
50
7 
Thailand 
50
4 
Timor-
Leste 11 
Viet 
Nam 
23
1 
  
W
es
te
rn
 A
si
a
 
Armenia 76 
Azerbaij
an 78 
Bahrain 
50
6 
Cyprus 
12
2 
Georgia 
or Yerevan or 
Saakashvili 
AND NOT 
Atlanta AND 
NOT Savanna 
AND NOT 
Augusta AND 
NOT Mrietta 
AND NOT 
Columbus AND 
NOT football 
AND NOT 
basketball AND 
NOT baseball 
10
84 
Iraq 
25
56 
Israel or 
Netanyahu or 
Gaza 
28
33 
Jordan 
AND NOT 
football AND 
NOT basketball 
AND NOT 
baseball AND 
NOT Chuch w/3 
Jordan AND 
NOT Michael 
w/3 Jordan AND 
NOT Brooklyn 
AND NOT 
obituary AND 
NOT Broadway 
AND NOT 
Oakland AND 
NOT Mr. Jordan 
AND NOT Ms. 
Jordan AND 
NOT Mr. Jordan 
AND NOT Joe 
w/3 Jordan AND 
NOT Mississippi 
AND NOT Jim 
w/3 Jordan AND 
NOT Robert w/3 
Jordan AND 
NOT Hal Jordan 
AND NOT 
Berman AND 
NOT Hockey 
67
1 
Kuwait 
24
6 
Lebanon 
78
5 
Oman 98 
Qatar 
42
0 
Saudi 
Arabia 
85
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Palestine 
28
9 
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11
78 
Turkey 
17
27 
United 
Arab Emirates 
42
4 
Yemen 
83
1 
96 
 
  
E
u
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p
e
 
E
a
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n
 E
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p
e
 
    
Belarus 
21
7 
Bulgaria 
11
9 
Czech 
Republic 
33
7 
Hungary 
30
1 
Poland 
58
7 
Moldova 44 
Romania 
23
8 
Russia 
or Moscow or 
Medvedev or 
Putin 
30
69 
Slovakia 
13
2 
Ukraine 
50
0 
  
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
e 
Åland 
Islands 3 
Channel 
Islands 13 
Denmar
k 
48
0 
Estonia 
12
7 
Faeroe 
Islands 2 
Finland 
37
0 
Guernse
y 20 
Iceland 
21
3 
Ireland 
14
13 
Isle of 
Man 15 
Bailiwic
k of Jersey 0 
Latvia 76 
Lithuani
a 95 
Norway 
58
8 
Sark 
Island 0 
Svalbard 
Jan Mayen 
Islands 0 
Sweden 
87
1 
United 
Kingdom or 
England or 
Britain or 
London 
12
448 
  
S
o
u
th
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
e
 
Albania 84 
Andorra 11 
Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
13
8 
Croatia 
21
8 
Gibraltar 29 
Greece 
16
80 
Holy See 
13
9 
Italy or 
Rome or 
Berlusconi 
38
15 
Malta 98 
Montene
gro 
19
1 
Portugal 
81
2 
San 
Marino 30 
Serbia 
28
8 
Slovenia 
12
8 
Spain 
22
52 
Macedo
nia 46 
  
W
e
st
er
n
 
E
u
ro
p
e Austria 
59
2 
Belgium 
93
7 
97 
 
France 
or Paris or 
Sarkozy 
88
48 
German
y or Berlin or 
Merkel 
10
07 
Liechten
stein 5 
Luxemb
ourg 33 
Monaco 20 
Netherla
nds 
19
7 
Switzerl
and 
25
6 
  
O
ce
a
n
ia
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 a
n
d
 N
ew
 
Z
ea
la
n
d
 Australia 
29
9 
New 
Zealand 67 
Norfolk 
Island 0 
  
M
el
a
n
es
ia
 Fiji 3 
New 
Caledonia 0 
"Papua 
New Guinea" 11 
Solomon 
Islands 2 
Vanuatu   
  
M
ic
ro
n
es
ia
 
Guam 14 
Kiribati 2 
Marshall 
Islands 4 
Microne
sia 1 
Nauru 0 
Northern 
Mariana Islands 0 
Palau 5 
   
  
P
o
ly
n
e
si
a
 America
n Samoa 6 
Cook 
Islands 3 
French 
Polynesia 1 
Niue 0 
Pitcairn 0 
Samoa 7 
Tokelau 1 
Tonga 7 
Tuvalu 0 
Wallis 
Futuna Islands 0 
 
 
  
Appendix B. Top 25 salient countries in 2011 New York Times coverage 
 
Search Term Country Sum Salience Spike Relative 
Deviation 
Increase 
rate 
Egypt or Cairo or Tahrir or Mubarak or 
Omar Suleiman 
Egypt 2695 225 1.34 45.24 4.08 
Turkey or Ankara Turkey 1741 145 1.31 48.81 6.50 
Pakistan or Islamabad Pakistan 1536 128 1.13 38.30 0.83 
Libya or Tripoli Libya 2139 178 1.10 51.83 6.75 
Greece Greece 1680 140 0.85 50.02 4.67 
Japan or Tokyo or Naoto Kan Japan 3664 305 0.69 31.05 11.58 
Iran or Tehran Iran 1560 130 0.60 34.89 5.75 
Canada or Ottawa Canada 3455 288 0.50 24.14 12.50 
Brazil or Brasilia or Sao Paulo or Rio de 
Janeiro or Dilma Rousseff 
Brazil 1522 127 0.50 30.66 4.83 
India or Delhi India 2769 231 0.49 34.72 12.42 
Syria or Damascus Syria 1201 100 0.46 31.56 6.67 
Italy or Rome or Berlusconi Italy 3715 310 0.45 27.17 13.83 
Russia or Moscow or Medvedev or Putin Russia 3069 256 0.44 24.46 10.75 
Ireland or Dublin Ireland 1559 130 0.39 24.56 3.33 
Afghanistan or Kabul or Karzai Afghanistan 2792 233 0.37 20.96 5.17 
Israel or Netanyahu or Gaza Israel 2833 236 0.37 18.29 4.50 
United Kingdom or England or Britain or 
London 
United 
Kingdom 
11404 950 0.34 26.05 30.58 
Spain or Madrid Spain 2513 209 0.32 30.93 8.50 
Georgia or Yerevan or Saakashvili AND 
NOT Atlanta AND NOT Savanna AND 
NOT Augusta AND NOT Mrietta AND 
NOT Columbus AND NOT football AND 
NOT basketball AND NOT baseball 
AND NOT Hockey 
Georgia 1078 90 0.31 17.05 0.17 
Iraq or Baghdad Iraq 2643 220 0.31 17.74 7.25 
Germany or Berlin or Merkel Germany 4877 406 0.31 26.80 19.33 
France or Paris or Sarkozy France 8848 737 0.28 21.04 14.83 
Hong Kong or Donald Tsang Hong Kong 1037 86 0.25 19.19 2.25 
China or Beijing China 5641 470 0.23 20.66 13.50 
Mexico or Calderon Mexico 2940 245 0.21 17.27 4.33 
 
  
99 
 
Appendix C. Insignificant Cross-Correlations between Times Series 
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Appendix D. Autocorrelations in original times series 
 
Autocorrelations in original 
Series:   Egypt in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .667 .097 47.660 1 .000 
2 .322 .096 58.868 2 .000 
3 .056 .096 59.209 3 .000 
4 -.049 .095 59.471 4 .000 
5 -.060 .095 59.874 5 .000 
6 -.043 .094 60.085 6 .000 
7 -.045 .094 60.316 7 .000 
8 -.002 .093 60.316 8 .000 
9 .038 .093 60.486 9 .000 
10 .076 .092 61.169 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Egypt in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .382 .097 15.620 1 .000 
2 .328 .096 27.282 2 .000 
3 .129 .096 29.096 3 .000 
4 .090 .095 29.984 4 .000 
5 .016 .095 30.014 5 .000 
6 -.024 .094 30.080 6 .000 
7 -.140 .094 32.319 7 .000 
8 .081 .093 33.067 8 .000 
9 -.034 .093 33.204 9 .000 
10 .007 .092 33.210 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
  
104 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Egypt in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .553 .097 32.756 1 .000 
2 .307 .096 42.917 2 .000 
3 .159 .096 45.665 3 .000 
4 .045 .095 45.887 4 .000 
5 .117 .095 47.419 5 .000 
6 .041 .094 47.605 6 .000 
7 .115 .094 49.105 7 .000 
8 .118 .093 50.706 8 .000 
9 -.030 .093 50.813 9 .000 
10 .028 .092 50.906 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Turkey in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .113 .097 1.374 1 .241 
2 .188 .096 5.182 2 .075 
3 -.041 .096 5.369 3 .147 
4 .103 .095 6.537 4 .162 
5 -.018 .095 6.572 5 .254 
6 .102 .094 7.742 6 .258 
7 .053 .094 8.067 7 .327 
8 .035 .093 8.203 8 .414 
9 .202 .093 12.919 9 .166 
10 .053 .092 13.252 10 .210 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Turkey in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 -.028 .097 .085 1 .771 
2 -.124 .096 1.734 2 .420 
3 .189 .096 5.639 3 .131 
4 -.250 .095 12.517 4 .014 
5 .160 .095 15.375 5 .009 
6 .142 .094 17.632 6 .007 
7 -.272 .094 26.059 7 .000 
8 .138 .093 28.243 8 .000 
9 .016 .093 28.274 9 .001 
10 .008 .092 28.281 10 .002 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Turkey in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .699 .097 52.341 1 .000 
2 .455 .096 74.764 2 .000 
3 .403 .096 92.493 3 .000 
4 .383 .095 108.635 4 .000 
5 .275 .095 117.072 5 .000 
6 .223 .094 122.673 6 .000 
7 .190 .094 126.764 7 .000 
8 .191 .093 130.937 8 .000 
9 .172 .093 134.359 9 .000 
10 .147 .092 136.909 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Pakistan in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .101 .097 1.089 1 .297 
2 .083 .096 1.841 2 .398 
3 -.082 .096 2.572 3 .463 
4 .073 .095 3.162 4 .531 
5 -.040 .095 3.342 5 .647 
6 -.065 .094 3.810 6 .702 
7 -.112 .094 5.230 7 .632 
8 -.079 .093 5.940 8 .654 
9 -.171 .093 9.344 9 .406 
10 -.001 .092 9.344 10 .500 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Pakistan in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .137 .097 2.015 1 .156 
2 .000 .096 2.015 2 .365 
3 .034 .096 2.144 3 .543 
4 -.016 .095 2.171 4 .704 
5 .212 .095 7.168 5 .208 
6 .077 .094 7.842 6 .250 
7 -.047 .094 8.095 7 .324 
8 .072 .093 8.684 8 .370 
9 -.012 .093 8.699 9 .465 
10 -.013 .092 8.719 10 .559 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Pakistan in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .356 .097 13.593 1 .000 
2 .185 .096 17.292 2 .000 
3 .085 .096 18.081 3 .000 
4 .026 .095 18.152 4 .001 
5 .116 .095 19.660 5 .001 
6 -.042 .094 19.856 6 .003 
7 -.031 .094 19.962 7 .006 
8 -.146 .093 22.419 8 .004 
9 -.104 .093 23.680 9 .005 
10 -.106 .092 24.988 10 .005 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Libya in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .355 .097 13.513 1 .000 
2 .323 .096 24.773 2 .000 
3 .125 .096 26.488 3 .000 
4 .141 .095 28.680 4 .000 
5 .065 .095 29.146 5 .000 
6 .025 .094 29.216 6 .000 
7 -.076 .094 29.865 7 .000 
8 .104 .093 31.096 8 .000 
9 -.140 .093 33.363 9 .000 
10 -.114 .092 34.875 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Libya in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .257 .097 7.087 1 .008 
2 .099 .096 8.155 2 .017 
3 .113 .096 9.546 3 .023 
4 .064 .095 10.000 4 .040 
5 -.080 .095 10.705 5 .058 
6 -.138 .094 12.845 6 .046 
7 -.150 .094 15.418 7 .031 
8 -.052 .093 15.731 8 .046 
9 -.021 .093 15.784 9 .072 
10 -.113 .092 17.283 10 .068 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Libya in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .638 .097 43.594 1 .000 
2 .436 .096 64.110 2 .000 
3 .340 .096 76.729 3 .000 
4 .330 .095 88.734 4 .000 
5 .245 .095 95.425 5 .000 
6 .041 .094 95.615 6 .000 
7 .010 .094 95.626 7 .000 
8 .040 .093 95.808 8 .000 
9 .056 .093 96.175 9 .000 
10 .006 .092 96.180 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Greece in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .291 .097 9.061 1 .003 
2 .234 .096 14.972 2 .001 
3 .092 .096 15.893 3 .001 
4 .170 .095 19.062 4 .001 
5 .080 .095 19.781 5 .001 
6 .036 .094 19.929 6 .003 
7 -.143 .094 22.244 7 .002 
8 -.220 .093 27.798 8 .001 
9 -.041 .093 27.997 9 .001 
10 .024 .092 28.066 10 .002 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Greece in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .274 .097 8.042 1 .005 
2 .212 .096 12.896 2 .002 
3 .106 .096 14.111 3 .003 
4 .052 .095 14.412 4 .006 
5 .061 .095 14.829 5 .011 
6 .116 .094 16.353 6 .012 
7 .180 .094 20.030 7 .006 
8 .136 .093 22.164 8 .005 
9 .102 .093 23.365 9 .005 
10 -.041 .092 23.565 10 .009 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
  
110 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Greece in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .684 .097 50.081 1 .000 
2 .544 .096 82.032 2 .000 
3 .427 .096 101.967 3 .000 
4 .389 .095 118.608 4 .000 
5 .364 .095 133.338 5 .000 
6 .250 .094 140.369 6 .000 
7 .109 .094 141.713 7 .000 
8 .035 .093 141.854 8 .000 
9 -.014 .093 141.876 9 .000 
10 .056 .092 142.245 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Japan in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .202 .097 4.372 1 .037 
2 .208 .096 9.042 2 .011 
3 .117 .096 10.539 3 .015 
4 .012 .095 10.555 4 .032 
5 -.007 .095 10.560 5 .061 
6 -.147 .094 12.980 6 .043 
7 -.075 .094 13.626 7 .058 
8 -.145 .093 16.051 8 .042 
9 -.050 .093 16.336 9 .060 
10 -.178 .092 20.063 10 .029 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Japan in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .305 .097 9.946 1 .002 
2 .282 .096 18.543 2 .000 
3 -.011 .096 18.555 3 .000 
4 -.188 .095 22.437 4 .000 
5 -.175 .095 25.837 5 .000 
6 -.162 .094 28.776 6 .000 
7 -.087 .094 29.639 7 .000 
8 .029 .093 29.733 8 .000 
9 -.028 .093 29.824 9 .000 
10 .126 .092 31.673 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Japan in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .495 .097 26.231 1 .000 
2 .227 .096 31.807 2 .000 
3 .028 .096 31.893 3 .000 
4 -.018 .095 31.927 4 .000 
5 -.048 .095 32.186 5 .000 
6 -.103 .094 33.379 6 .000 
7 -.116 .094 34.899 7 .000 
8 -.050 .093 35.190 8 .000 
9 -.095 .093 36.231 9 .000 
10 -.169 .092 39.593 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   UK in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .127 .097 1.715 1 .190 
2 -.041 .096 1.892 2 .388 
3 .013 .096 1.910 3 .591 
4 .045 .095 2.135 4 .711 
5 -.002 .095 2.136 5 .830 
6 -.122 .094 3.805 6 .703 
7 -.063 .094 4.252 7 .750 
8 -.236 .093 10.653 8 .222 
9 -.081 .093 11.417 9 .248 
10 -.005 .092 11.419 10 .326 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   UK in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .018 .097 .036 1 .849 
2 .148 .096 2.407 2 .300 
3 -.025 .096 2.474 3 .480 
4 -.059 .095 2.862 4 .581 
5 .047 .095 3.110 5 .683 
6 -.183 .094 6.887 6 .331 
7 .075 .094 7.526 7 .376 
8 -.126 .093 9.348 8 .314 
9 .017 .093 9.380 9 .403 
10 .020 .092 9.428 10 .492 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   UK in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .830 .097 73.670 1 .000 
2 .635 .096 117.203 2 .000 
3 .517 .096 146.360 3 .000 
4 .502 .095 174.194 4 .000 
5 .516 .095 203.885 5 .000 
6 .475 .094 229.286 6 .000 
7 .419 .094 249.257 7 .000 
8 .341 .093 262.601 8 .000 
9 .326 .093 274.972 9 .000 
10 .311 .092 286.320 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   France in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .235 .097 5.892 1 .015 
2 .147 .096 8.227 2 .016 
3 .007 .096 8.232 3 .041 
4 .075 .095 8.860 4 .065 
5 -.010 .095 8.870 5 .114 
6 -.026 .094 8.947 6 .177 
7 -.013 .094 8.965 7 .255 
8 -.098 .093 10.063 8 .261 
9 .083 .093 10.861 9 .285 
10 .008 .092 10.869 10 .368 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   France in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .088 .097 .832 1 .362 
2 .035 .096 .961 2 .618 
3 .016 .096 .989 3 .804 
4 -.013 .095 1.007 4 .909 
5 .197 .095 5.345 5 .375 
6 -.108 .094 6.664 6 .353 
7 -.025 .094 6.736 7 .457 
8 -.054 .093 7.067 8 .529 
9 .018 .093 7.106 9 .626 
10 -.003 .092 7.107 10 .715 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   France in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .686 .097 50.303 1 .000 
2 .507 .096 78.124 2 .000 
3 .396 .096 95.279 3 .000 
4 .347 .095 108.530 4 .000 
5 .374 .095 124.130 5 .000 
6 .274 .094 132.566 6 .000 
7 .244 .094 139.355 7 .000 
8 .178 .093 143.009 8 .000 
9 .228 .093 149.062 9 .000 
10 .144 .092 151.487 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   India in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .143 .097 2.191 1 .139 
2 .036 .096 2.328 2 .312 
3 .071 .096 2.886 3 .410 
4 .046 .095 3.122 4 .538 
5 .052 .095 3.422 5 .635 
6 -.165 .094 6.490 6 .371 
7 -.021 .094 6.540 7 .478 
8 -.051 .093 6.843 8 .554 
9 -.040 .093 7.030 9 .634 
10 -.016 .092 7.059 10 .720 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   India Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .022 .097 .051 1 .822 
2 .013 .096 .070 2 .966 
3 -.153 .096 2.614 3 .455 
4 -.088 .095 3.471 4 .482 
5 .096 .095 4.497 5 .480 
6 .000 .094 4.497 6 .610 
7 -.041 .094 4.692 7 .697 
8 .073 .093 5.308 8 .724 
9 .082 .093 6.087 9 .731 
10 .005 .092 6.089 10 .808 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   India in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .755 .097 61.013 1 .000 
2 .683 .096 111.469 2 .000 
3 .606 .096 151.584 3 .000 
4 .618 .095 193.727 4 .000 
5 .598 .095 233.481 5 .000 
6 .551 .094 267.692 6 .000 
7 .512 .094 297.485 7 .000 
8 .460 .093 321.739 8 .000 
9 .540 .093 355.562 9 .000 
10 .490 .092 383.711 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Iran in Brookings, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .124 .097 1.651 1 .199 
2 .458 .096 24.347 2 .000 
3 .085 .096 25.139 3 .000 
4 .283 .095 33.968 4 .000 
5 .088 .095 34.829 5 .000 
6 .220 .094 40.270 6 .000 
7 -.019 .094 40.311 7 .000 
8 .084 .093 41.116 8 .000 
9 -.076 .093 41.781 9 .000 
10 -.023 .092 41.841 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:   Iran in Carnegie, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .093 .097 .918 1 .338 
2 .005 .096 .921 2 .631 
3 -.043 .096 1.123 3 .772 
4 -.098 .095 2.189 4 .701 
5 .010 .095 2.199 5 .821 
6 .083 .094 2.972 6 .812 
7 -.001 .094 2.972 7 .888 
8 .135 .093 5.064 8 .751 
9 .048 .093 5.328 9 .805 
10 -.089 .092 6.258 10 .793 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
 
 
 
Autocorrelations 
Series:   Iran in News, original   
Lag 
Autocorrelatio
n Std. Errora 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.b 
1 .752 .097 60.523 1 .000 
2 .728 .096 117.815 2 .000 
3 .626 .096 160.655 3 .000 
4 .619 .095 202.921 4 .000 
5 .536 .095 234.879 5 .000 
6 .516 .094 264.830 6 .000 
7 .535 .094 297.320 7 .000 
8 .472 .093 322.903 8 .000 
9 .429 .093 344.219 9 .000 
10 .348 .092 358.414 10 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation. 
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